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FOREWORD
While the relationship between productivity advance and economic
growth has long been recognized by both economic researchers and prac-
titioners, at no time has the significance of such link been considered more
crucially than today when greater productivity is taken to be a key ele-
ment in the Philippines' current economic recovery program.
Taken in such light, the study presented in this monograph assumes
greater relevance and importance. The study was prepared by Richard
Hooley, Professor at the University of Pittsburgh and a Visiting Research
Fellow at the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PiDS) in 1984.
It traces productivity change over the period 1956-1980 in the Philippine
manufacturing sector as a whole and in two dozen individual industries
at the three-digit level, analyzes the causal factors behind this change,
and looks into the processof diffusion of productivity gains.
The findings of the study cannot be taken lightly. It indicates that
productivity in Philippine manufacturing has been declining since the late
fifties and that, accordingly, productivity gains in agriculture have been
offset by productivity declines in the manufacturing sector in the last
twenty five years or so. This should lead policymakers to take a second
look at the industrial policy environment and institute early actions which
can reverse the trend. Some leads into what these actions could be are
provided by Hooley in this study.
FILOLOGO PANTE, JR.
President
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PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING:
RETROSPECT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
Richard Hooley
In recent years, we have witnessed an increased awareness of the
importance of productivity growth to economic progress.This is reflected
in the rapid expansion of the productivity literature which hasdealt prima-
rily with the developedcountries of the western world. There has alsobeen
some work focusing on newly-industrializing countries of East Asia, such
as South Korea and Taiwan. Studies, however, of productivity growth in
lessdeveloped countries (LDCs) are still in a very early stage. This is un-
fortunate because,as Kuznets (1966) has repeatedly pointed out, an under-
standing of the pace and factors underlying changes in productivity is
vital to our understanding of growth in per capita income. When under-
taken on an industry basis, productivity studiesprovide a wealth of detail
on output and inputs over time that are invaluable in making informed
assessmentsof the effects of industrialization policies.
Initial efforts to measure and analyze productivity performance in
the Philippines as well as other ASEAN countries focused on agriculture.
The establishment of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
in 1960 was a milestone in this respect. Researchersat the Institute com-
piled both macro and micro data on rice productivity trends and perform-
ance over an extended period for a number of Asian countries (Hayami,
Ruttan and Southworth, 1979; Herdt and Wickham, 1978). While'the
primary focus of work at I RRI is on rice, there has been a spillover toward
efforts directed at measuring and analyzing productivity performance in
• agricultural production as a whole, asexemplified by work at the University
of the Philippines at los Bafios. The postwar record• in agriculture has
been studied in depth by a number of scholars including Barker and
Crisostomo-David (1979), Hooley and Ruttan (1969), Paris (1971) and
Patalinghug (1980). Much less attention has been given to other sectors
presumably because agriculture is considered the dominant industry in
these economies. In addition, policymakers concentrated on productivity
improvement in agriculture because of their perception that stability of
food (i.e., rice) prices constitutes the vital linchpin between economic
progressand political stability.
These perceptionsare not iustified by the facts. In 1950, a_riculture
contributed almost one-half of Philippine GNP while manufacturing con-
tributed only one-fifth. By 1982, however, agriculture's Sharehad dropped
to 30 percent while the shareof manufacturingexceededthat of agriculture
by a slight margin. The prospects are that this increase in the relative
importance of industry will continue in the immediate future. Pricestability
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as well as the efficiency of the macro-economic system is increasingly
dependent on 1:heperformance of the manufacturing sector. The case for
shifting attention to productivity change in industry is clear and unam-
biguous.
Several studies of productivity growth in Philippine industry have
been carried out in the past. The earliest is that of Hooley (1968) which
covered the period 1948 to 1961 and concluded that total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) in manufacturing advanced at a modest paceof about 2 percent
Per year. Williamson and Sicat (1968), using the Denison methodology,
studied technical change in the period 1957-1968 and estimated the annual
rate of advance for all manufacturing at approximately one percent. After
accounting for aggregation effects, they concluded that intra-industry
growth in TFP was nearer 1-½ percent per annum. The inference of the
H0oley and Williamson/Sicat studies taken together is that industrial pro-
ductivity was undergoing retardation for the period of the fifties and sixties.
A recent study by Estanislao (1981) covering the period 1956-1978
concludes that TFP growth was high prior to 1970 but fell to 5 percent
or less for most industries during the past decade. Unlike the previous
studies which utilize census data, Estanislao's data base consists of time
series constructed from a sample of the largest one thousand corporations.
Questions can be raised about its comparability with data used for other
studies, partly because it is limited to large corporations and also because
it is based on enterprise rather than establishment data. Patalinghug (1980),
utilizing census data, estimated TFP growth in manufacturing for 1956-
19_0 at 3.6 percent per year. He found that large firms registered a signifi-
cantly more rapid rate than small firms. Finally, Sanchez (1983) estimated
TFP in manufacturing at nearly - 5 percent per year for the period 1957-
1978. Sanchez' estimates are based on Survey of Manufactures data but
do not take account of the change in size of establishment underlying the
census estimates after 1974. The enlargement of the Survey sample by
inclusion of small firms (less than 10 workers) after 1974 overstates the
rate of employment growth resulting in a downward bias in the produc-
tivity seriesand makes it difficult to interpret her results for extended time
periods or to compare them with the findings of other investigators.
The purpose of the present study is threefold. First, we want. to
measure the rate of output growth, both for manufacturing as a whole as
well as for two dozen individual industries for the period 1958 - 1980.
Second, we wish to determine the role played by the increased use of
traditional inputs, on the one hand, and technological change, on the other,
in the growth performance of manufacturing industries. Finally, we wish
to determine what policies are most appropriate for improving the con-
tribution of productivity change in industrial growth.
The study employs a body of census data specially processed here,
showing annual output and input data for individual manufacturing in-
dustries at the 3-digit ISIC level. We believe that our approach, focusing
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as it does on a cross-sectionof industries constructed on a consistent basis
over a 25-year period, makes possiblean in-depth analysis of causal factors
behind productivity change along with the processof diffusion of produc-
tivity gains. We also quantify intra- asopposed to inter-industry productivity
Changefor subperiods.The industry disaggregationis very helpful in relating
macro variables (e.g., capital utilization) with micro studies of industry
performance. Finally, the estimates of industry performance are used to
assessthe impact of fiscal, monetary, and industrialization policies on the
efficiency of manufacturing industries. The implications of the overall
performance on the pace of Philippine development will also be analyzed.
I. THE MODEL
To measure productivity, we utilize a model developed by Gallop and
Jorgensen (1980) for measuring sectoral productivity change. The model
posits an aggregate production function characterized by constant returns:
Q : F (L,K,X,t)
whereQ representsproductionand L,K and X, inputs,whiletdenotestime,
Moreover,thesectorconsistsof n industriessothatwe have.
Q = ZQi
L = _L i
K = _K i
X = _X i (i = 1, 2,... n)
Assuming profit maximization, producer equilibrium requires equality of
the value shares of each input denoted v(L), v(K), v(X) and the elasticity
of output with respect to a particular input:
PL L a In Q
VL - qQ a In L
PK K a In Q
V K _--- qQ a In K
PX X a In Q
V x - qQ a In X
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where q is the price of production and P(L), P(K), and P(X) are the prices
of labor, capital and intermediate inputs, respectively.As the Sectorconsists
of i industries, it is also necessaryfor producer equilibrium that there exists
equality between each of the sharesof individual inputs in the value of the
corresponding aggregateand the elasticity-of the aggregatewith respect
to the individual inputs:
iLli PL a In L
V
L ._.. L a In L i
i PiKKi
v = - alnKK P KK a In K i
i X i
Px xi -- -aln
V x P X X a In X i (i = 1, 2, . .., n)
'Differentiation of the aggregateproduction function above with respect
to time yields
d In Q a In Q d In L a In Q d InK
--p-- _-
dt aln K dt a In K dt
+ a In Q d in X a In O
--+
In X dt t
d in L d In K d In X
- +v -- + vX + vtVL dt K dt dt
where v(t), the residual, is the rate of change of total factor Productivity.
In the above expression, the rate of growth of sectoral output is ex-
pressed in terms of sectoral aggregates of the various inputs. However, under
the assumption of constant returns to scale, sectoral (i.e., aggregate) inputs
can each be expressed as a weighted average of rates of growth of their
components, with weights given by the corresponding value shares:
• d In L i
d In L = 2; ViL dtdt
" d In K id In K = _vt K
dt dt
d In X _ _ vix
d In X i
dt dt
4
Gallop and Jorgensenhave extended this methodology to incorporate.
data at discrete points of time. They suggesthleasuring technical change
at any two points in time as the difference between successivelogarithms
of production less a weighted averageof the difference between successive
logarithms of sectoral labor, capital and intermediate inputs with weights
derived asaveragevalue shares.
In Qt-ln Qt-1 =Vi [ln L t-ln Lt_l]+ vK __ln Kt - In Kt_l_" ]
+ Vx Un Xt -- In Xt__|]+ Vt
where
= +v,_,_,]
=. +
This is the translog index of sectoral technical change.
The above index of technical change can also be obtained by the use
of data at the individual industry level. In this case;we derive the difference
between successivelogarithms of sector inputs as the weighted averageof
differences between successivelogarithms of industry inputs with weights
given by averagevalue shares.For example, labor input is:
-.[ ,_ ,]ln.L t- In Lt_ 1 = vL In 1t _
and the other inputs are handled in a similar way.
II. THE DATA BASE
.For the basic data .on output, labor, capital and intermediate inputs,
we utilize the Annual Surveys of Manufactures along with the periodic
Census of Manufactures from 1956 to 1980. Thesedata provide a consistent
set of measurements in the sense that totals for different variables are
5
constrained to cover the same establishments. Moreover, the establishment
data are presented at the 3-digit industry level, coded on the basisof the
international standard industrial classification system. This yields a con-
sistent set of annual data by industry for a continuous period of 25 years -
long enough to provide us with a basisfor making reliable inferences for the
whole sector aswell asindividual industries.
There are, however, important adjustments to be made before these
data can be utilized for productivity analysis. One of the most important
relates to treatment of changes in the size of firms covered by the Survey.
Up to 1975, the Annual Surveys covered establishmentswith 5 or more
workers, with a separate tabulation for establishments with 20 or more
workers. But during the censusyears (1961,1967, 1972 and 1975), coverage
was limited to establishments with 10 or more workers, with a separate
tabulation (for a few variables) for all establishments regardlessof size.
Beginning in 1975, a further change took place: Annual Survey data cover-
age was extended to all establishments regardlessof size and no separate
tabulation was published for firms with five or more workers. The changing
coverage of the manufacturing censusesand Annual Surveys is shown for
each year in Chart 1.
These shifts in coverage create a nasty econometric problem. On the
one hand, it is possible to develop a consistent time seriesfrom 195.6 to
1974, using Annual Surveys and applying appropriate interpolation pro-
cedures for the censusyears of 1961, 1967, and 1972. On the other hand,
there is no way to interpolate for firms with 5 or more or over 20 workers
after 1974 because there is no benchmark to use. The shift in coverage
from larger to smaller establishments (included in the all establishment
total) after 1975 destroys the consistency in coverage between output and
inputs which is so essential for our investigation due to the fact that the
input/output structure of small firms differs substantially from that of
largefirms.
We decided to construct our time seriesof relevant variablesfor estab-
lishments with 20 or more workers. There are two reasonswhich persuaded
us to restrict coverageto the larger establishments.The first isthe conviction
that as we descend to smaller establishments (certainly for establishments
with lessthan 5 workers), we are faced with householdproduction functions
rather than with firm production functions. For very small firms, it is
reasonable to view the production decision as an integral part of the house-
hold decision on the (household) allocation of time (Becker, 1965). In
contrast, our model postulates the existence of an explicit production
function and maximization behaviour within that context - an assumption
which is reasonablefor larger firms where production decisionsare distinct
from household decisions. A second reason is essentially statistical: we
feel that by excluding the very small establishments, we obtain a higher
quality data base becauselarger establishmentsare far more likely to keep
6
Chart 1
Censusand Surveys of Manufacturers,
Coverage of Establishments
Year Establishments 5 Workers 10Workers _>20 Workers
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
196:3
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
-1969
1970
1.9_1
1972
1973
1974
'1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
books along conventional accounting lines, yielding both better quality
data and more detail on a greater variety of variables. Both these inferences
are borne out by the Survey: data are available on a wider variety of
variables for establishments with 20 or more workers and, where error
measures have been calculated by the National Censusand Statistics Office
(NCSO), they are smaller for the largerestablishments. 1/
Our problem is to adjust the Survey data for all establishments by
eliminating establishments with one to nineteen workers. Our task is com-
plicated by" the fact that the share of eachvariable accounted for by these
smaller establishments follows a unique pattern, and in no case is itsimply
a mirror imageof the proportion of the uncovered establishments.
The shifting relationship between gross value-added, employment
and size of firm is illustrated in Chart 2. The curves in the chart portray
the cumulative fraction coverage for value-added and employment as we
move from smaller to larger establishment. In general, establishments of,
say, five workers or less account for a higher fraction of employment than
value-added. For larger establishments, the reverse is the case. Unfortunately,
these curves do not linearize when transformed into logarithms, although
transformation does somewhat improve empirical fits.
Our estimating procedure involved making two separate estimates -
one for the number of establishments and the other for the particular
economic variable involved. First, we estimated the percent of all establish-
ments included by restricting our attention to establishments larger than
some given size. We did this by the use of an equation relating the cumula-
tive percent of establishments covered to the average number of workers
per establishment and the reciprocal of fixed assets per establishment.
The second step was to convert cumulative establishment coverage to cover-
age of a given variable (percent of production, value-added, inventories,
etc.). The nature of tile model we are describing is shown in Appendix B.
By focusing attention on firms with a labor force >/20 workers, we deal
with only about 15 percent of establishments (i.e., we exclude about 85
percent) but we cover about 90 percent of production. This reflects the
fact that concentration ratios are high in Philippine manufacturing. How-
ever, concentration ratios vary by item and by industry, so although the
same general model is applicable to all variables, it must be estimated
separately by variable and by industry group. Readers interested in ad-
ditional details on this procedure should consult Appendix A where the
equations are specified and illustrated by estimation of production for
all manufacturing estab ishments with 20 or more workers for 1985. 2/
1/Recent efforts of the NCSO In expanding Survey coverage to all establishments are, for the
above reasons, unfortunate. At the very least, efforts should be made to show data on basic variables
for large establishments as well asall establishments for selected yearsso that coverage by variable can
be inferred.
2/Some industries have approximately the same curves, so it is possible to _ombine them into
groups and thereby greatly reduce the task of fitting.
Chart 2
Relationship Between Size of Establishment;
Gross Value Added and Employment
Employment
perestablishment
_S0and
over
40 !
• '/1
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30- )
20 _j /
10 /--'"/_ VALUEADDED0
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•' CumulativePercentof ValueAdded, Employment
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The second major adjustment to the census data is for changes in
prices. Most previous investigations of productivity change in Philippine
industry have used the Central Bank _holesale price index as a deflator.
From our standpoint, use of this index in its present form presentsseveral
problems. First, the breakdown of the index does not follow censusindustry
• categories, so that deflation of output at the industry level is impossible
for most industriesat the 3-digit ISIC level which makes use of the Central
Bank Wholesale Price Index (CBWPI) unsuitable for our purpose. There
are other reasons as well. The CBWPI includes unprocessedas well as man-
ufactured goods (e.g., food grains, copper and other ores, etc.). Not only
are some of these commodities not manufactures, but some, such as food
grains, are heavily subsidizedby the government further compromising the
performance of the index even as a measure of the general price level of
manufactured goods. Finally, the CBWPI was computed in recent years
as a weighted geometric mean of prices. This tends to bias the index down-
ward (and to correspondingly bias upward any seriesdeflated by this index)
due to the well-known tendency of the geometric average to minimize
largervalues.
For this study, we prepared a producers' price index by going back
to the original Central Bank records and extracting the price and related
specifications for all commodities produced by domestic manufacturers.
Commodities were classified by industry and weighted by value-added
produced in 1972. Twenty-four industries (at the 3-digit ISIC level) were
then identified, and combined with 1972 value-added weights to obtain
the overall index. The index is a Laspeyreswith 1972 as baseyear. Fu,'ther
details on this industry index and details regarding its construction are
en - 3/shown in App dix _.
The above constitute the major adjustments which we made to the
published data to improve their Consistencyas measuresof real flows over
time. There is also a third adjustment. The Survey data exhibit a "stepwise"
behaviour over time due to the adjustment of the Survey sampling frame
after each Census. For most of the variables, this is not a major factor
when considering long periods, becausehighsand lows (before and after
each Census)averageout. However, it is a problem when usingthe perpetual
inventory approach to estimating capital stock because all errors in the
annual investment estimates are cumulated in the capital stock series.We
have eliminated this stepwise movement from the investment expenditure
seriesby a processwhich we describefully in Appendix 19when explaining
the construction of the capital stock series.
3/We ran a sensitivity test by using 1975 base year weights. The results were essentially the
same for the aggregate index as well as for individual industries.
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III. ESTIMATES OF OUTPUT; INPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY
A. Output
We define output as grossproduction - i.e., deliveriesfrom manufac-
turing establishments adjusted for inventory change. The Census estimate
of gross output closely approximates gross production. It consistsof the
value of shipments adjusted for inventory change, plus contract and repair
work done for others, along with receipts from resalesof goods. The value
of sales represents selling price f.o.b, plant, net of discounts, allowances
and returns. We feel that while contract and repair work are legitimate
manufacturing operations, resale of goods is not. However, we have not
attempted to adjust the Census of figures of gross output for this item
because if we were to adjust output, we ought to adjust inputs used in
resalesas well, which is not possible.Second, resalesconstitute onlyabout
3 to 4 percent of the gross output of our sample of establishmentswith
little change over time, too small to significantly affect the measuresof
output growth over long periods.
Our deflator consists of a producer price index constructed for this
project for each 3-digit industry, and discussedin detail in Appendix B.
Becauseof the way the price data were collected, the price index contains
the effects of businesstaxes and subsidies.Thus, the price index contains
an element of price change which implicitly measureschanges in indirect
taxes, including tariffs (by far the most important) to the extent they are
passed on to purchasers.Becauseof the importance and complexity of
the industry structure of indirect taxes and tariffs in this country, we think
that removing the changein the businesstax structure by an implicit method
- i.e, by includinl_ the tax effects in the output deflator - representsthe
bestand mostfeasibleapproach.4/
Estimatesof averageannual rates of growth of production by industry
are shown in Table 1.
B. Labor Input
Estimates of labor input series are based on the Annual Survey of
Manufacturing Establishments totals. Survey data are limited to total
employment, number of paid employees and the number of unpaid family
workers. To be sure, there existsa separatelabor force survey, _hePhilippine
Statistical Survey of Households (PSSH), which contains additional data
from which we can derive age/sex composition. However, the data from
the PSSH Labor Force Survey are classified as agriculture/non-agriculture.
4]We occasionally use grossvalue.added as a measure of output in this paper, though not for
total productivity measures. For a discussion of procedures used to estimate gross value-added in
constant prices, seethe section on measurement of intermediate goods inputs.
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Even if one makes the heroic assumption that age and sex breakdowns
for manufacturing are essentially the same as non-agriculture, this would
still only produce information for the manufacturing sectorasan aggregate,
not for individual industries.
The procedure adopted here is to utilize the establishment data to
produce totals for. employment at the 3-digit industry level. We convert
part-time and unpaid family workers to full-time equivalent workers (FTE)
by using the conversion factors developed by Tidalgo (1976). The resulting
estimates of labor input are FTE measuresbut use the Censusbenchmarks
as control totals. We later introduce age, sex and educational dimensions
of changes in labor input when dealing with productivity measuresat the
aggregate(sectoral) level, and then only within the context of the assump-
tion of the similarity between trends in the manufacturing / non-agriculture
aggregatesmentioned above.
Labor income is available in the form of payroll data for establish-
ments at the industry level. This provides the basis for weighting labor
input, and is described more fully later under the discussionof input
weights. Data on FTEs by industry and for all manufacturing are shown
in Table 2.
C. Capital Services
An index of capital input is developed from estimates of capital stock
and the rate of return on capital. The estimates of capital stock at replace-
ment cost were developed specifically for this study, and will be described
in detail due to the obvious importance of this input in the final outcome -
the estimatesof total productivity.
The Annual Surveys provide two different pieces of information
from which one can construct an estimate of fixed capital: the book value
(i.e., depreciated value) of the stock of fixed assetsas of January 1 each
year and the volume of investment expenditures undertaken during the
year. Some previous investigators have based their estimates of capital
input on the depreciated book value of fixed assets(Hooley, 1968; William-
son, 1971; Williamson and Sicat, 1968; Patalinghug, 1980). More recently,
Power (Bautista, Power and Associates,1979) has shown that it is possible
to develop estimates of grossundepreciated capital stock from the Annual
Survey estimates of depreciated book value by introducing additional
information on the depreciable life of assets. Finally, by adjusting un-
depreciated capital by an appropriate price deflator, he arrived at gross
capital stock at replacement cost.
There is a problem, however, in basing fixed capital stock estimates
on reported book value of fixed assetsafter 1960. During the decadesof
the sixties and seventies, the domestic price level underwent rapid inflation.
This price rise was the result of the rise in international prices along with a
13
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depreciation of the.Philippine pesoof approximately 1,000 percent between
1960 and 1984. By the mid-1960s, some firms had begun to show assets
in their balance sheet at replacement rather than at original cost. At this
time, the country's premier accounting firm, Sycip, Gorres and Velayo,
was strongly recommending asset revaluation to its customers. In 1971,
the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants issued a special
bulletin recommending that, in view of the substantial inflation in prices
• of capital assets,all public accounting reports show fixed assets• at replace-
ment value rather than at original cost. 5/Since that time, the overwhelming
majority of industrial firms haveadopted the convention of revaluing their
fixed assets periodically. Unfortunately, the procedures for revaluation
are not standardized acrossfirms. Reappraisalby a consulting engineering
or accounting firm appears to be the most common method; not the use
of a price index. Moreover, the date of reappraisalsis generally not shown,
so it is unclear whether a firm's assetsare being expressedin terms of re-
placement cost of year t, or year t-l, or t-2, etc. Since the data collected
from firms by the Census personnel are obtained from the interviewees'
balance sheets, the published Survey data also contain these adjustments.
Therefore, the industry aggregatesof the book value of fixed assetspub-
lished in the annual Survey already include an adjustment for asset price
changes. However, the date and the nature of the adjustment procedure
are both unknown.
In view of these difficulties, we decided to use data on investment
Outlays as contained in the annual Survey/Census for constructing our
estimates of capital stock. Becauseof the stepwise behaviour of the com-
bined Survey/Census of Manufactures data due to the under-reporting
of investment of new firms in the Survey estimates,thesehad to be adjusted
for intercensal trend in the manner described in detail in Appendix D.
Once this is done, it is possible to obtain estimates of grosscapital stock
by aggregatinginvestmentexpendituresover time.
The estimate for gross fixed assetsat replacement cost in year t is,
n
Kgt =_; (I/P)t- ii=1
where (I/P)t-1, (I/P)t-2, are investment expenditures in the years t-l, t-2,
etc. deflated by a price index of investment goods for each year t-l, t-2,
etc. The estimates of I are the adjusted investmentexpenditure data from
the Survey. That is, they are adjusted for stepwisebehaviour and deflated•
with an investment goods price index. Fortunately, we found accessto
5/Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Generally Accepted Accounting Pro-
cedures, Manila, 1978, Chapter 19.
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data on actual depreciable life of assets,so that we did not h_e to assume
a value of n, but had an observedvalue of depreciable life for each 3-digit
industry in 1975.6/
If we know the depreciable life of assetsto be n years, and the average
actual life of assets•in use, A, it is.possible to derive the net stock from the
grossstock of assets(Bautista, Power et al., 1979) :
__ [ nKdt Kgt (n--A)
In this way, we derived our net stock of capital at replacement cost
for each industry at the 3-digit level. This procedure involvesthe "sudden
death'" assumption of capital assets,but this primarily affects the smooth-
ness with which the capital stock series changes rather than the average
levelof the stock over time.
Application of the perpetual inventory method of estimating capital
stock to Philippine data is complicated by the effects of World War II.
Manila, the center of most of the country's manufacturing industry before
the war, was completely devastated during the War. The first post-war
data on capital stock is contained in the 1949 Census of Manufactures,
or three years after reconstruction was underway. It is unreasonable to
extrapolate backwards using•the 1949 benchmark through the war years.
to obtain estimates of annual investment expenditures during the war
period. Such a procedure would ignore the wholesale destruction of the
capital stock that took placeduring those years. In view of these consider-
ations, we adopted an end-year 1955 book value of fixed assetsasa bench-
mark and adjusted that figure for the difference in capital asset prices
between the period 19.50-1956 and 19"12, our base year for replacement
cost. This assumesthat the capital stock existing in 1956 was constructed
at prices of 1950-1956 which, giVen the circumstances of extensive war
destruction•, appears reasonable. This formed the benchmark from which
the fixed capital stock was estimated on the basis of investment expend-
itUres for subsequent years.
A separate estimate of inventory was developed by averaging begin-
ning and ending inventories of each year for each industry as given in the
various issuesof the Survey of Manufactures. Annual estimates of capital
input, for fixed assetsand inventories, in 1972 prices, are given in Appendix
D along with a detailed description of methodsused.
The model we are using to measurecapital input requiresthe estimation
of the flow of capital services.Our estimate of capital serviceflows is derived•
as the product of net capital stock expressed at replacement cost and the
rate• of return. The rate of return is •estimated as the rate excluding de-
6/A special survey of depreciable life of assets, by industry, was undertaken by the NCSO in
1975.
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preciation and after income taxes. Data for the latter were obtained from
the year-end annual issuesof Business Day, which lists the income of the
1,000 largest companies. We excluded non-manufacturing firms and re-
classifiedthe remainder according to industry. The results provided uswith
an estimate of net returnsfor all manufacturing and each individual industry.
We feel that the resultsyield essentially accurateestimates of the net return
by industry, since there is a substantial degree of overlap between our
population of Censusestablishmentsand the manufacturing firms included
in the Business Day survey_ The latter survey focuses on the largestfirms
and these, we have shown previously, hold a disproportionately largeshare
of the capital stock. 7/
Table 3 presentsestimates of capital servicegrowth rates by industry
for the period 1956 - 1980.
D. Intermediate Inputs
The Survey of Manufactures defines total cost of all materials as
suppliesand fuels used in production, includingthe cost of goodsfor resale,
as well as the cost of servicessupplied by others, including electricity. The
relationship between production (O), value added (VA) and intermediate
inputs (M) can be written as VA(t) =Q(t) - M(t). In countries -;_hereprice
data are plentiful, different price indices are used to deflate Q and M. In
the Philippines as in most LDCs, due to the lack of appropriate price series
to deflate intermediate inputs, production and value-addedare both deflated
by the same price series on final output. Then the constant price series
for intermediate goodsis determined as a residual, i.e.
#
M t = Qt/Pt - VAt/Pt
where the asterisk denotes constant prices and P is a price index of final
output.
The above procedure is acceptable to the extent that prices of final
goods move with prices of intermediate outputs. In an open economy
7/We estimate that about 500 of the Business Doy, sample of firms fall into our classification
of manufacturing establishments. Thus, about 15 percent of the largest manufacturing establishments-
from the Survey would be included in the.Business Doy sample. However, bY using Our asset distri-
bution function by size of establishments, we estimate that the largest 15 percent of establishments
in all manufacturing control 63 percent of the fixed assets of the entire manufacturing sector. Thus,
the overlap of coverage for the two samples, is high for .capital stock even though it is low by number
of establishments.
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such as this, one would expect a close relationship between aggregates
of these two price series.8/ However, for industries disaggregatedat the
3-digit level, the same close relationship cannot be expected. Aside from
variance among prices of imported commodities, a major reason is the
shifting structure of tariffs which are far more variable by industry than
they are for sectoral aggregates.Now to the extent that an industry has
a tariff on its final output, the effects of the tariff on enlarging value-add _1
will be removed by deflation with the final-price deflator b_causethe tariff
effects are implicitly registered in the price series. The same is not true,
however, of the effects of tariffs on intermediate inputs which a particular
industry uses. These are not caught by the final price series, and to the
extent these are allowed to remain, they cause value-added to be over-
or understated and, correspondingly, causeintermediate inputs to be under-
or overstated.
In order to adjust for the changesin tariffs on intermediate inputs,
we adjust our value-added seriesby use of a deflator which we denote by
EPI (effective protection on intermediate inputs). 9/
t
1 + EPRjEP] =
t t
1 + T
J
The net result of this operation is a value-added which is double de-
flated provided that the final goodsprices and intermediate input pricesof
industry move together, aside from differences in protection rate changes
on output and inputs. To the extent that theydo not move together, we
have an estimate of value-added (and therefore of intermediate inputs)
which is semi-doubledeflated.
We developed estimates of EP! by use of the following procedure.
We prepared estimates of EPI for the benchmark years of 1965, 1969,
19;75 and 1980 based on the work of Medalla (1979), Power (1971), and
Tan (1979), and usingthe input-output tables for 1965 and 1975 prepared
8/A simple regression of the Central Bank wholesale price index of domestically produced goods
on the wholesale price index of imported goods yields the fitted function DOM = 8.7 + .97 IMPORT
with an r = .98 for the 26-year period 1949-1975. The value of the coefficient for the slope,.together
with the intercept significantly greater than zero, suggeststhat while domestlc prices do move closely
with prices of imports, other factors also have a significant impact on the general level of domestic
manufacturers prices.
9/Erlinda Medalla developed this deflator. Details on its derivation and additional discussion
of Its significance can be found in Appendix E.
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by the NCSO. We then linked these by interpolation, and extended them
back to 1956 on information which we obtained directly from the economic
research staff of the Central Bank as well as from Baldwin (1975).
The resulting estimates of intermediate input growth are shown in
Table 4.
E. Total Factor Productivity
We have described the construction of input and production estimates
for manufacturing over the period 1956-1980, the sources of data, methods
of deflation and other necessary adjustments to the data base. The net
result is the generation of annual production and input year from 1956
to 1980, and for all manufacturing as an aggregate.
To construct an index of total factor productivity for each industry,
we express sectoral output Z(t) as a translog function of labor input N(t),
capital input K(t) and intermediate input M(t) for each industry:
= i v i n Nt t-TFPi I n Z_ - I n Zt_ 1 - N
- vi n K_ - I n K_ - v n M_- I n M_K - M -
where share weights v(N), v(K), v(M) are computed from data on the value
of production, the value of labor input, the value of capital input and the
value of intermediate inputs of the i(th) industry. The resulting indices of
TFP are shown in Table 5 annually for each 3-digit industry.
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE RECORD =
This section provides a summary of the performance of Philippine
manufacturing between 1956 and 1980. This consists of an overview of
trends in growth of output and inputs, total and partiai productivity
measuresfor the sector as a whole followed by an analysis of the perform-
ance of individual industries.
The major trends in industrial productivity from 1956 to the present
are summarized in Table 6. Over the entire period, TFP decreased by -.15
percent annually. This average conceals important differences during sub-
periods. Between 1956 and 1970, TFP increased at an annual rate of +.56
percent while from 1971 to 1980, the rate fell to -1.23 percent. Since1975,
TFP has been declining at an alarming two percent or more per year. The
strongest performance was registered during the years 1966-1970; the
weakest during the years after 1975. For the manufacturing sector as a
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whole, the data paint a very clear picture - one of slow TFP growth during
the late fifties and sixties, unmistakable retardation after 1970, with rates
of advance after 1975 assuming significantly larger negative dimensions.
When certain additional adjustments for labor quality improvements are
made (which cannot be made on the disaggregatedTFP totals due to data
problems), the averageannual ratesare uniformly lower for the entire period
as well as for all subperiods. 10/How much importance should we attach
to these resultsfor industry in the aggregate?
That depends on two considerations. First, to what extent are the
sector totals representative of performance of individual industries? This
question can be answered readily with the help of the material presented
in a later chart (Chart 4) which showsthe distribution of TFP for twenty-
five manufacturing industries. Half of these (13 industries) had annual
rates of TFP growth less than zero. Of the remainder, only one had an
annual average of over 2 percent. It is clear, therefore, that there is not
enough dispersion in individual industry performance to challenge our
impressionof zero or negativegrowth reflected in the sector totals of Table
6.
There is still a question of the extent to which the productivity per-
formance of the manufacturing sector is the result of an aggregationeffect.
Williamson and Sicat (1968; 1971) found that a substantial part of the
retardation in productivity growth rates that they observed could be at-
tributed to inefficient resource allocation among industries which they
attributed to dysfunctional maoro policies such as protective tariffs. So
we now compare observed productivity growth of the manufacturingsector
as shown in Table 6 With that which would have occurred if the industry
structure of manufacturing had remained unchanged.The resultsareshown
in Table 7 which decomposessectoral productivity growth into that due
to advanceswithin industriesand that accounted for by the shift in activity
from one industry to another.
One conclusion to be drawn from the estimatespresentedin Table 7
is that inter-industry shift resulted in a net loss of productivity for the
entire twenty;five year period and for both of the subperiods.In this respect,
our findings agreewith Williamson and Sicat (1968) who found a net loss
in TFP growth (for the period 1956-1965) due to inter-industry shift.
However, our evidence suggeststhat this net loss, while unquestionably
significant, was not the whole story. Although within industry, TFP change
is positive throughout, it also reflects significant retardation between sub-
periods. Hence, we conclude that inter-industry shift cannot by itself
account for slow productivity growth in manufacturing.
lO/The adjustments for labor input - hours worked, age/sex composition and education levels -
were made on the basis of data for non-agricultural employment. The use of the adjusted TFP
estimates therefore requires the additional assumption that trends in these variables are the same for
manufacturing and the rest of the non-agricultural labor force.
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Table 7
AnnualGrowth Rate,TFP Within and Between
Industry,All Manufacturing,1956-1980
(Ratesof changein percent)
(1) (2) (3)
All Manufacturing Within .Industry BetweenIndustry
1956-1980 -.15 .49 -.64
1956-1970 .56 .77 -.21
1971-1980 -1.23 .34 -1.57
Source: Cbl. (1): Table6.
Col. (2): Estimatedusing1956 production weights.
Another inference made by Williamson and Sicat (1968;1971) con-
cerning the dysfunctional role of macroeconomic policy, particularly import
substitution, also deserves careful consideration in light of the afore-
mentioned data. We do agree that the shift in manufacturing activity
dictated by import controls and the protective tariff structure associated
with import substitution brought about a significant decline in manufactur-
ing productivity, by setting up the wrong inter-industry shifts. However,
it was not just the policy of import substitution as such which caused
the problem, but the particular industries targeted for expansion. That is
to say, prior to 1956, the Philippines was already moving inthe direction
of a "natural" importsubstituti0n: the food processing, beverage, tobacco
and apparel industries accounted for roughly fifty percent of total man-
ufacturing production_ By 1980, the share of these industries in production
had fallen to only 29 percent. The gainers were industries like petroleum,
paper, industrial chemicals, rubber, metal products, etc. Productivity growth
in the former group has consistently led that in the latter group. Part of
the reason for the absence of incentives for more rapid growth of what we
call the "natural" import substitution industries lies in specific macro-
economic policieS, and part is attributable to theadverse effects of certain
international price trends which have had severe repercussions on some
of these industries. For example, historically low sugar prices have had a
devastating impact on the :sugar refining industry, which produces both
or export as well as for the domestic market. The net upshot of our results
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is that while resource misallocation from an ill-conceived import substitution
policy accounted for a significant part of the lackluster productivity perfor-
mance in manufacturing, it was not the only factor and probably not the
most important factor either. If these results hold generally, then a certain
critical policy inference follows: the productivity gains associated with a
movement towards optimal resource allocation are modest.
Turning now to an analysis of productivity change during subperiods,
examination of the trends in Table 6 reveals that the year 1970 was a water-
shed in Philippine industrial productivity performance. During the period
1956-1970, TFP increased by an average rate of .56 percent. During the
following decade (1971.1980), TFP declined by 1.23 percent per year.
Substantial declines are reflected in the labor and intermediate partial
productivity measures as well. Particularly notable is the very sharp de-
cline in production per worker - from +4.56 percent in 1956-1970 to
-1.73 percent in the 1971-1980 period. Growth of the other productivity
measuresalso declinecl, although by smaller magnitudes.
Within the earlier period (1956-1970), there are several distinct sub-
periods. During 1956-1960, the establishment of new industries got under-
way primarily through import allocations and a substantially overvalued
exchange rate which underpriced capital inputs. Output expanded rapidly
and productivity gains were substantial. This was followed by a period
(1961-1965) in which productivity measures in the 1961-1965 period is not
difficult to explain. In 1960-1961, the peso was devalued, a move which
had been widely discussed in the Philippine Congress and anticipated in
business circles for at least two years previous. Businessmen reacted pre-
dictably by importing all the capital equipment and inventories that they
could financially manage. From 1961 to about 1963, productivity fell
as the new equipment was installed, old factories enlarged, etc. By the
end of 1963, the output from much of this new investment was reaching
optimum levels, and, productivity was on a correspondingly upward trend.
TFP growth registered its best record in the 1966-1970 period.
During the following decade, however, all our industrial productivity
measures indicate a fundamental change in trend. TFP declined by .6 and
1.9 percent annually in the next two five-year periods (when adjusted for
changes in labor quality, the declines increase to 2.6 and 2.0 percent, res-
pectively). The negative trends for 1971-1975 are all the more surprising
because this period witnessed one of the truly major Philippine export
booms of this century. Expansion of output is ordinarily associated with
rising, not falling productivity, as pockets of excess capacity are eliminated
and firms generally move toward optimum production levels, and increased
tightness in factor markets helps improve resource allocation. That such
an improvement did not take place is clear. Indeed, the data in Table 5
indicate that TFP registered negative values for all the years of this historic
expansion -i.e., 1972 through 1975.
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There are several developments in the organization of Philippine
industry which are closely associatedwith the decline in TFP growth after
1970. One such development is the particularly dysfunctional inter-industry
shifts after 1970. During the decade 1970-1980, inter-industry shift account-
ed for an annual decline of 1.57 percent in TFP, compared with only .21
percent annual loss in the period 1956-1970. This losswas due to macro
policies which brought about the expansion of industriesthat were relatively
poor "productivity performers." It reflects the national policy bias towards
"heavy" import substitution industries (petroleum, iron and steel, transport
equipment, etc.) associatedwith import substitution policy in this country.
It also reflects the bias in policy implementation which pushedintermediate
goods prices down below international levels.Another development is con-
nected with the changing tariff structure. The tariff revision of 1973 not
only raised protective rates across the board but also shifted the structure
of protection on inputs for many manufacturing industries. As pointed out
earlier, the effective protection given to manufacturing consisted of two
components: a final goods component and an input component. The net
effect of the latter wasto reduce the pricespaid by the manufacturingsector
for intermediate inputs below what they otherwise would have been. Prices
of inputs were reduced by five to ten percent between 1956 and 1969.
The net effect of the tariff revisionof 1973 was to reduceprices of inter-
mediate inputs by another 25 percent between 1970 and 1980. This had a
significant impact on the intermediate goods consumption per unit of out-
put as can be seen from Table 6. From 1956 to 1970, production per unit
of intermediate input declined at the rate of -1.15 per annum, reachinga
peak of -1.86 percent during 1976-80, the highest rate of decline over the
entire 25-year period.
This is not the whole story behind the decline in TFP growth after
1970, however, because production per worker also declined dramatically
during the last decade - at the annual average rate of -1.73 percent. To
understand this development, we must consider the rise of government-
controlled and government-affiliated corporations since 1970. Based on
data which we obtained from the Hooley-Moreno Flow of Funds study
and the Central Bank, the relative sharesof non-financial government cor-
porations in total non-financial corporate assetsfor selected benchmark
dateswere estimatedas follows:
1955 18,2 percent
1960, 14.9 percent
1965 13,5 percent
1980 27.1 percent
1982 33.4 percent
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There was a decline in importance of government corporations in the
fifties and sixties. This trend was reversedduring the late sixties or early
seventies. The above estimates attest to the magnitude of the expansion
of the shareof government non-financial corporate assets- growth of more
than two and a half times between 1965 and 1980. We might add that our
•estimate of 33.4 percent of assetscontrolled by government corporations
probably understates the relevant magnitude of asset control. This figure
only refers to corporations in which ownership by the government or gov-
ernment agenciesamounts to 51 percent of outstanding stock. Actually,
however, many corporationsare really government-affiliated through control
by members of the military or closeassociatesof powerful political/military
families, and could, under alternative definitions, be classified as govern-
ment-controlled. If the definition of government corporations were so
extended, the share of non-financial corporate assets falling into this
category would surely exceed 50 percent.
The significance of the expansion of government-controlled cor-
porations for productivity trends lies in three characteristics.First, govern-
ment corporations generally•are not run primarily for profit. Many obtain
their capital through the legislaturewhich mandatesthat they put primary
• emphasison •publicservice.Second, their utility function is often drawn to
make expansionof their employed labor force a primary goal of operations,
taking precedence over profitability. Third, some•governmentcorporations
are not audited by the General Auditing Office of the Philippine Govern-
ment (GAO). Organizationsofficially designatedasgovernmentcorporations
are audited by the GAO. But some "private" corporations in which the
Philippine Government (or one of its agencies) holds over one-half of the
outstanding stock may not be audited by the GAO. Overall, therefore,
accountability standardsare quite uneven, weakeningfurther the traditional
systemof rational economic incentives.
The impact of this unusual collection of incentives and ambiguous
legal and accountability environment can be seen in the productivity com-
parisons of government and private corporations presented in Table 8.
•TFP in private corporationswas only 12.4 percent higherthan in govern-
ment corporations during the fifties. A decade later, however, it was 56.2
percent higher. So the shift of corporate assetsfrom private to government-
controlled must have had a significant downward impact on TFP perform-
ance for all corporations taken in the aggregate. Looking further at the
partial productivity comparisons,production per worker was essentiallythe
same for private and government corporations in 1950-1960. But from
1960-1970, the government sector recorded a particularly disappointing
performance with production per worker falling to about one-fourth that
in the private sector. On the contrary, it performed better than the pri-
vate sector with regard to the use of intermediate inputs, and only some-
what more poorly in its useof capital,
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Table8
Comparisonof ProductivityPerformance
Non-FinancialGovernmentCorporationsandPrivately-OwnedCorporations
(Allmeasurementsinpercent)
Pvt. Corp.ProductivityMeasure
Govt. Corp.ProductivityMeasure 1956-70 1971-80
Productionperworker 99.1 406.2
Productionperunitof intermediategoods 103.4 66.5
Productionper unitof capital 414.2 520.0
Total FactorProductivity 112.4 156.2
Source: Dataderivedfrom Flowof Fundsworksheets.
These results are precisely what would be expected given the economic
environment as we have described it and the macro policy mix followed
after 1970. The decline in production per worker is consistent with the
experience in the Philippines as elsewhere, that government and government-
affiliated corporations generally are burdened with the goal Of maximizing
employment rather than optimizing employment. Given this institutional
framework, and considering the accelerated growth of the non-agricultural
labor force since the late sixties, it was only natural for the government
corporate sector to increaseemployment well beyond firm-optimum levels,
with a correspondingly disastrous impact on labor productivity. On the
other hand, since most government corporations (and many government-
affiliated ones as well) were exempt from part or all of import duties any-
way, the restructuring of the tariff system in 1970 did not affect their
behaviour appreciably. That is why government corporate performance
was superior to private corporate performance on this count. The somewhat
poorer performance in output per unit of Capital probably reflects the fact
that many government and government-affiliated corporations received pre-
ferential treatment on borrowings from the large government financial
institutions which had the effect of weakening incentives to operate the
capital stock efficiently. Private corporations, on the contrary, weresubject
to sharply rising interest ratesfrom 1970 on.
A third factor, but one of considerably less importance in our opinion,
which may have had negative effects on productivity growth after i970
was the oil crisis. Sharp oil price increasesin 1970-1971 affected the cost
structures of some industries more than others, and may haveencouraged
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some industry-specific shifting towards lessoptimum production positions.
In addition, fuel shortagesand associated"brownouts" throughout the early
seventies undoubtedly resulted jn significant declines in production per
unit of input acrossa wide spectrum of industries.Of course, the crude oil
shortagesreduced productivity levelssubstantially inthe petroleum refinery
industry. However, most of this is already accounted for in our measureaf
capital services,which implicitly takes account of declines in capitalutiliza-
tion.
A fourth factor operating to deepen the industrial productivity crisiswas
a miscalculation of businessmenand policymakers concerning the likely
duration of the recessionof 1975-1978. As pointed out earlier,TFP registered
a small annual decline even during the boom years of 1971-1975. No one in
government or businesswas prepared for the shocking decline in manufac-
turing output of nearly 11 percentfrom 1975-1976.11 / Indeed, the decline
was not even widelydiscussed. The immediate causewas-the collapseof the
primary commodity boom in important Philippine manufactures such as
sugar, plywood, etc. Sharp declines in non-manufactured primary exports
(copper and other metals, unprocessedfood products) exerted a significant
downward multiplier effect on domestic income. Apparently, no one
related the contraction in local industry to erosion in efficiency parameters.
Most businessmenand government planners assumedthat the situation was
essentially temporary and. would correct itself as soon as international
commodity prices recovered. This interpretation of events is supported
by the fact that in spite of the sharpdecline in manufacturing production,
the expansion of labor input and the rate of capital formation in manufact-
• uring continued unabated through early 1977.
By late 1978, production began to recover and the investment rate
immediately began to accelerate. But productivity had fallen significantly.
Apparently, neither businessmen nor government officials realized the
extent of the decline in real production nor, more importantly, the per-
manent damagedone to theefficiency of the industrial system by external
developments and by the decline in both labor productivity and TFP (which
continued to decline). Foreign commercial banks, apparently the most
uninformed of all, continued to flood the industrial sector (particularly
government corporations) with ever larger loan funds, effectively expanding
money supply, propping up effective demand and generally postponing
the inevitable reckoning.
Finally, the information we have on researchand development in in-
dustry suggeststhat little, if any, of the windfall gains from the boom of
1972-1974 were channeled into industrial researchwhich would have made
Philippine manufactures more competitive both domestically and inter-
nationally.
11/These are our deflated production estimates based on the Survey of Manufactures. The
decline was 1.2 percent in 1975, mostly in the fourth quarter, and 9.8 percent in 1976..
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One factor behind the productivity decline during the seventieswhich
we cannot measurebut which we are convinced is of central importance is
the increased centralization of economic decision-making. The evidence
from numerous countries is that overcentralization leads to widespread
inefficiencies and misallocation of resources. When decision-making be-
comes highly centralized, businessreaction functions are altered in two
ways. First, there is a slowing down of the tempo of reactions because
economic actors must always make sure that any action will not be vitiated
by decisions coming down from the top. Second, there• is an inevitable
politicization of economic activity since an obvious way to protect
one's interests is to seeto it that top decisions are made according to "appro-
priate" criteria. It is much more profitable to spend one's time talking to the
top decision-makers than instituting measuresto raiseefficiency. This process
affects participants in both the private and public sectors. Inevitably, the-
economic system ties itself in knots, as business executives and middle-
level bureaucrats try to keep their options open, while the top policymakers
are increasingly overwhelmed with minor problems and distracted by an
unending dialogue with lobbyists.
The decline in industrial productivity has continued so long and is so
pervasive among industries that it is now exerting significant negative
Impacts on other parts of the domestic economy. The financial system has
been greatly weakened. The rate of return on manufacturing capital has
declined markedly in recent years. In part, this was due to the narrowing
of price-cost margins reflecting sharp declines in commodity prices (e.g.,
refined sugar) after 1975. But the decline in TFP of domestic industry was
also a major factor in the decline of the rate of return on manufacturing
capital. The Philippine financial system holds most of manufacturing sector
debt. Much of this debt is now hopelessly behind in payments on principal
and interest because the assets backing it are earning at very low rates,
and in many casesnot earning at all. Indeed, it is no coincidencethat among
the industrial loans giving the Development Bank of the Philippines the
greatest financial trouble are those to industries which all display negative
productivity (TFP) growth over the period 1956-1980: cement, textiles,
and integrated paper mills. 12/
The decline in the solvency of the domestic financial system, caused
primarily by the decline in industrial productivity and the misallocation
of resources,has poseda special problem for monetary policy. If the Central
Bank "rescues" all of the unstable commercial banks, money supply targets
are bound to be exceeded by a wide margin. So the poor productivity
record eventually complicates the task of achieving price stability.
The dysfunctional effects of industrial productivity decline do not
12[i n Manila banking circles, the present situation is generally, referred to as "liquidity crisis."
It is nothing of the sort: It issolvency crisis.
32
end with the decimation of financial institutions. Becauseof the low rate
of return on domestic industrial assets which consistently negative.pro-
ductivity growth has helped to produce, the flow of saving into the Phil-
ippine financial system is now being affected. Why should Filipino savers
choosea financial system which is able to pay only a low deposit rate and
is, in addition, financially unstable?The obvious answer for the nation's
savers is to choose an alternative financial system. In Chart 3, we show
the rate of return on manufacturing capital assets (at 1972 replacement
cost) contrasted with the interest rate on U.S. Treasury Bills. The rate of
return on capital invested in Philippine manufacturing actually fell below
the U.S. Treasury Bill rate in 1978. Note that the relative rates of return
and grosscapital outflows from the Philippines do indeed move together.
While we acknowledge that there may also be other reasonsfor the large
capital outflow from the Philippines after 1975, we feel that the deteriora-
tion in productivity performance transmitted to the domestic financial
system through the rate of return is a key element.
A major reason for the decline in the rate of return in the manufacturing
sector has been the decline in the capital utilization rate. Our index of
capital utilization (with 1972 asbaseyear) is asfollows:
1956 98.7
1960 106.0
1965 83.2
1970 91.1
1975 102.9
1980 77.7
During the commodity boom of 1971-1975, the capital utilization
rate rose but never reached the level of 1960. This is surprising given the
momentum of the worldwide boom in primary commodity prices. After
the boom ended, it fell sharply between 1975 and 1980. At the present
writing, it is very probably around 70 percent, and possibly below 60 per-
cent. The decline enters into our estimate of the rate of return directly,
through the estimate of the stock of capital in place. 13/T o conclude this
section, we have argued that the steady decline in TFP, especially after
1970, greatly weakened the financial system partly through the portfolio
effects of declining industrial asset quality, and partly by causing savers
to shift funds to the rest of the world, setting up a major drain on the
balance of payments.
131The capacity utilization index is composed of an index of capital in place - at replacement
cost - divided by an index of power consumption of manufacturing establishments. For more details,
see Appendix C.
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Chart 3
Rate of Returnon CapitalEmployedin PhilippineManufacturing,
the U.S. TreasuryBill Rate and
the Volume of CapitalOutflows,1972-1982
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*Capital includesfixed assetsplusinventory.Rate'of returnisnet
incomeafter taxes(1972 prices)dividendby capitalof reproduction
costat 1972 prices.
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V. TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY BY INDUSTRY
A summary of the record of individual industry performance at the
3-digit ISC level is shown in Chart 4. TFP growth for the period 1956-
1980 varied widely among industries from less than -2 percent to over
+2 percent per annum. The modal value is clearly negative, however,
roughly -.5 percent. Industries falling above the mode are generally the
older "natural" import substitution and export industries, such as food
processing, apparel, tobacco and beverages.The laggards in productivity
performance are generally the newer industriesestablishedunder the "forced
industrialization" policies of the post-war era, such as paper, basic metals,
transportation equipment, and glass.In a real sense,therefore, the manufac-
turing sector has been Very heavily dependent, for what increasein overall
efficiency it has shown, on a small group of industries, many of which can
trace their beginningsto the years before World War II. The fact that so
many of the industries founded since 1955 have exhibited negative TFP
growth rates is a major factor in explaining why the manufacturing sector
has not grown faster and why it is so vulnerable to bottlenecks in input
supplies.
On the other hand, real production during the same period grew by a
much more rapid rate - between 6 and 9 percent per year. Nearly half
of all industries recorded annual rates of increase in real production of
10 percent or more. For comparison purposes,we also show real gross
value-added. Although the modal value of the latter is higher than that
of real production, the mean is lower because of the large number of in-
dustries which grew (on the value-added basis) at annual rates of between
0 and 6 percent per year. There are reasons for the tendency of production
growth to outstrip growth of value-added which reflect shifts in input use,
a subject to which we now turn.
Real production per worker advanced at a modal rate of approximately
3 percent per year. Again, there was wide variation with some industries
registering gains of as much as 6 percent or more, but with a much larger
group of industries registering gains of less than 2 percent, and a number
showing declines.
Since the annual growth of TFP is clearly below that of production
per worker, substitution of some other factor(s) for labor must have taken
place. 14/It has often been correctly assumed that increases in production
per worker could be explained by capital-labor substitution. There appears
to have been a modest amount of capital-labor substitution. This isreflected
in the lower modal rate of growth of production per unit of capital of
between 0 and 2 percent (note that the lowest frequency class is open_
14/That is, assuming no changes in hours of work. The data we have onhours worked for non-
agriculture support this assumption.
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Chart 4 (Continued)
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Chart4a
Indicesof Productionand Inputsof
Twenty-four ManufacturingIndustries,1958-1980
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Chart 4a (Continued)
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ended). However, there is a great deal of disparity in capital productivity,
and it appears that there were quite a few industries which experienced
little or no capital-labor substitution.
The matter is immediately clarified when we turn to the data on pro-
duction per unit of intermediate goods. Here we seeevidence of an astonish-
ingly high rate of substitution of intermediate inputs for both labor and
capital. The modal rate of annual growth of output per unit of intermediate
goods is between -.I and -I .0, with a mean annual growth rate of around
-2.0 percent per year. Consumption of intermediate outputs has increased
at a substantially more rapid rate than either labor or capital. This is ad-
ditional evidence at the industry level of the effects of declining trends in
factor prices - trends which were an unintended side-effect of government
food subsidy and tariff policies. Increases in intermediate input usageimpact
decisively on TFP trends, indeed, the reader may have noticed a similarity
between the contour of the industry distribution of growth rates of pro-
duction per unit of intermediate inputs and that of TFP (Chart 4). The
reason is because of the heavy weight intermediate goods receive - they
represent two-thirds or more of total input payments for most industries.
VI. THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY GAINS
The evidence just reviewed shows that a number of industries achieved
modest increases in total factor productivity during the period under review.
How were these gains distributed? Theory suggests that in a free market
economy, productivity gains are distributed through lower prices of final
output. We tested this by regressing average annual rates of change in TFP
against average annual rates of change in price of output for our cross-
section of twenty-five industries at the 3-digit level. The initial results
using only one explanatory variable were satisfactory, yielding the correct
sign and a t-value of over 3. The fit was improved substantially, however,
when we introduced a dummy variable to isolate industries which either
(a) export over 50 percent of their output or (b) import over 50 percent
of their intermediate inputs. In both these cases, price is hypothesized to
be exogenously determined with respect to the domestic economy. The
evidence supports this view because t-values are higher, the scatter about
the regression line is reduced and explanatory power as measured by the
correlation coefficient is improved. The elasticity of price with respect to
TFP is -.75, implying a substantial impact of TFP on prices of manufac-
tured goods, a fact to which price stabilization policy might well give serious
attention. 15/
15[Kendrick, estimating the same relationship for a group of U.S. Industries (but not limited
to manufacturing), shows a coefficient of -- .89, not too much different from the abov% but differ-
ent enough to suggest somewhat less price sensitivity to TFP change in the Philippines compared to
the U.S.
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One would expect that industries which exhibit price declines due to
technological advances would also record corresponding increases in out-
put. Charts 5 and 6 illustrate the extent to which this relationsll_p holds
in this country. The regression of price on quantity yielded an R(2) of
only .06 in the first fit) so we introduced a dummy variable for export
industries where quantity shipped is presumably independent of domestic
price. The results were not markedly different. The R(2) rose only to .12.
The coefficient of Q is negative as expected. However, while the T-value
for both Q and the dummy variable are both greater than one, neither is
statistically significant. There are several possible interpretations of this
result. Our specification of the relationship between industry production
and price may be faulty. 16/
Or it may indicate that there has been substantial market intervention
by the government to the extent of disturbing the underlying economic
relationships. Finally, industrial markets may be characterized by mono-
polistic competition altering expected price-quantity relationships. 17/
Chart 7 depict¢ the relationship between percent changes in TFP and
production. We obtained an improved fit by isolating export industries
and industries that experienced an increase in effective protective rates
of 45 percent or more (Dum). in both these cases, we expect that the
relationship between TFP and productionwill be altered. The coefficient
of TFP is slightly above unity but the t-value is not significant at the .05
level of confidence. The t-value of Dum x is significant only at the .10
level of confidence, suggesting the possibility that export industries may
exhibit unique behaviour in regard to the impact of TFP on quantity pro-
duced. The relationship between productivity change and production is,
at best, weak.
In order to derive some idea of the impact of these developments on
employment, we regressedpercent change in employment on percent change
in real production. As expected, the regression coefficient is positive and
highly significant (t=11.44). However, the value of the coefficient is only
.47. We feel this is rather low in view of the country's expanding labor
force. In order to absorb its pro rate share of labor force growth of
approximately 4 percent per annum, real production in manufacturing
must grow by 8 percent. What is the potential contribution of TFP growth
here? Given that (ceteris paribus) the elasticity of production growth to
TFP is 1.08, the elasticity of employment expansion to TFPgrowth is .51
(.47 x 1.08). Thus, for every one percent growth in TFP, we may expect,
ceteris paribus, a .51 percent growth in employment via the positive effects
on output. For years, the growth of manufacturing employment has tended
16/That is, either the period covered - 1956-1980 - may be Zoo long or relevant explanatory
variables may have been omitted,
17/Romeo Bautista notes that since price change interacts with both supply and demand varia-
bles, a more complex model specification might improv e the price-production relationship. I agree, but
note that this simple model hasyielded stronger results elsewhere (Kendrick, 1982),
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to fall short of labor force growth. The above calculation Suggests that even
a TFP of 2 percent per year would suffice to raise the growth of manufac-
turing employment above that of the total economy-wide labor force if it
were coupled with an annual increase in manufacturing production (sans
productivity effects) •of more than 6.3 percent. A major reason for the
employment problem in the Philippinesis the failure of TFP to advanceat
an acceptable rate.
To sum up, there is evidenceof a direct and •significant relationship
between TFP and price of final output. This relationship is attenuated in
the case of industries which•either export most of their output or import
most of their intermediate inputs. In either case, price is exogenousto the
domestic economy. But for the remaining industries,the relationshipseems
stable and the size of the coefficient suggestsimpacts on price from TFP
of significant size. There seemsto be a relationship between TFP and quan-
tity produced basedon our industry cross-sectiondata, but a much weaker
one with correspondingly reduced explanatory power; We found a strong
relationshipbetween real production and employment (Chart 8) and, based
on estimated coefficients, we conclude that the elasticity of employment
with respect to TFP growth is approximately +.5. This indicatesthat TFP
growth is an important potential contributor to the solution of the employ-
ment-growth problem.
Chart 8
Annual Percent Change in Production and
Employment, by Industry, 1956-1980
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We also investigated the relationship between real wage rate.changes
and TFP (Chart 9) and concluded that while there •might be some relation-
ship, it is a weak one with little potential for a significant impact of TFP
changes on real wage rates. Hence, the insignificant potential, for distribu-
tion of productivity gains via changes in real wage rates. This result is what
one would expect, given the large number of unemployed and underemploy-
ed workers in the labor force. If, contrary to recent experience, TFP gains
were large and sustained over an extended period, the volume of unem-
ployment_ undere.mployment would be steadily reduced, and a positive
impact of TFP on real wages would emerge. -
Chart 9
Annual Percent Change in the Real Wage Rate and
Total Factor Productivity, by Industry, 1956-1980
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Vll. DETERMINANTS OF INTRA-INDUSTRY PRODUCTIVITY
GROWTH
In recent years, increased attention has been given to designing policies
to assist in productivity improvement. A. branch of the Asian Productivity
Organization provides advisory services on productivity improvement for
individual firms. The National Productivity Commission, created by Exec-
utive Order in 1980, has as its main objectives the improvement of national
productivity through research, dissemination of information and public
promotions. More recently, a National Productivity Council has been form-
ed. The Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industries has also launched
its own program of productivity improvement aimed at private firms in
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the non-agricultural sector. Each of these organizations•has a somewhat
different perception of the type of policies needed to stimulate produc-
tivity growth. We feel it will be helpful to •bringour data and findings to bear
on the question of what policies are potentially most useful in improving
productivity performance in the manufacturing sector. We do this by an
examination of inter-industry differences in productivity performance.
We have selected 14 factors as potential explanatory variables for pro-
ductivity differences among industries. The variables, together with their
symbols,are:
CSIZE. •Percentchange in averagesizeof establishments.
ECOST. Change in percent energy cost to total production cost.•
INGDS. Change in percent intermediate inputs to total inputs.
MIGDS. Change in percent of imported intermediate goods to total
intermediate goodsused.
MLAJT. Change in percent of value added activity located in Metro-
politan Manila compared to the entire country.
• FEM/T. Change in percent of female workers to the total workforce.
E×/TN. Change in percent of workforce represented by executives.
PR/TN. Change in percent of production workers to the total work-
force.
SLVR. Variability of salary scale, all employees, 1975.
R & D. Research and Development activities.
EPR. Percent change in effective protection rate between 1956
and 1975.
EX/PN. Percent of production of each industry exported in 1980.
Wherever possible, we have tried to regress the percent rate of TFP
change on the percent change in the explanatory variable. There were
four manufacturing Censuses taken during the period - 1961, 1967, 1972,
and 1975. The 1967 Census omitted reports on all the employee variables
(by industry) and therefore is not useful for our purposes. The 1972 and
1975 Censuses are too close to one another. In effect, this reduces us to
observing changes between 1961 and 1975. For a few variables, the 1961
Census did not contain any information (e.g., on exports by industry).
In such cases, we are left with the single alternative of calculating some
index of the relative importance of that variable among industries for 1975.
This is the explanation for not using percent change for two variables -
R & D and export activities. The above list of variablesdoes not exhaust
the potential explanatory factors for productivity differences among in-
dustries, but is an optimum list in terms of the data constraints which con-
fronted us. We would, for example, have liked to obtain a measure of ed-
ucation and average age of workers by industry; unfortunately, the Census
does not report data on those variables. Labor force surveys do, but the
47
latter are not cross-classifiedby industry.
Some of the above factors are clear as to their expected impact on pro-
ductivity change. Some are not. We now briefly discussthe rationale for
including each factor and the expected sign of the regressioncoefficient.
CSIZE. The percent change in average (employment) size of estab-
lishments is used to determine what, if any, impact economies of scale
have on TFP growth. Studies of manufacturing establishments in other
countries suggest that there are significant scale economies as firms grow
from small to medium size (Griliches and Ringstad, 1971). The expected
sign ispositive.
ECOST. The vulnerability of industries to the sudden increase in
energy costs during the seventies is the reason for selecting this variable.
It may also serve as a proxy for capital per worker. The first consideration
would suggesta negative sign. However, to the extent that there is inter-
correlation with capital per worker, this could be reversed to a positive
sign.
MLA/T. The concentration of economic activity as measured by
the share of production taking place in the Metropolitan Manila area is
presumed to measure external economies of scale, and therefore the ex-
pected sign is positive.
FEM/T. The ratio of females to total workforce is essentially a
proxy for ageand educational level. The expected sign is negative.
MIGDS and INGDS. These two variables measure the ratio of inter-
mediate inputs to production (INGDS) and the ratio of imported/inter-
mediate goods to production (MIGDS). Both of these variables can be
considered as measures of the vulnerability of industries to disruption
from dependence on external markets for supplies. The MIGDS addition-
ally measuresany positive productivity effects derived from the improve-
ment of intermediate inputs imported from abroad. For example, if
improvements of imported chemical inputs to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry result in improved quality of final pharmaceutical products, there
is a transmission of productivity improvement from the foreign supplier
industry to the domestic industry. The expected sign for the "embodied"
effect is positive; whereas the expected sign for the transmission of "dis-
ruptive" effects is negative.
EX]TN. We consider the ratio of executives to total workforce
to be a reflection of internal management style. Our view of managerial
-models suggests a negative sign because some observers view many firms
here as "top-heavy" in management. Note that this variable will probably
be negatively correlated with production workers as a percent of total
workforce.
PR/TN. The ratio of production workers to total workforce is, for
reasons outlined above, likely to be positively related to TFP. The expected
sign is positive.
48
SLVAR. Variation in salary (compensation) is measuredby a variance
coefficient based on earnings of executives, operators and non-operators.
Generally, we feel that low relative wage levelsfor operators reflect a short-
sighted approach by management which deemphasizes quality, training
and experiences among operators. The expected sign is therefore negative.
R & D. Two measuresof R & D activity are available. One consists
of a tabulation of patents applied for in the Philippine Patent Office, com-
piled by industry for the decades 1961-1970 and 1971-1980 (Medalla,
Mikkelsen and Evenson, 1982), broken down by industry. The second set
of data consistsof a survey of researchwork done for others by industry
for 1975, compiled by the Census Office. Each of these measureshas po-
tential but also presents some problems. Patents represent identifiable
improvements in an industry's products or the way of delivering it. Patents
exclude, however, many research activities devoted to applying known
techniques and ideas to a firm's production. For example, working out an
optimum inventory plan or conducting research on the best methods of
plant layout, etc. or in an apparel firm, conducting researchon styles and
market trends which significantly upgrade product quality. We are inclined
•to believethat in the early stagesof manufacturing, it is preciselythese latter
type of researchwhich are likely to be particularly important. Our data on re-
search done for others also present problems. If firms perform research
for others, then there is a reasonable implication that they are doing it
for themselves as well. But the reverse is not necessarilytrue: absenceof
contract research does not necessarily indicate that no in-house research
is going on. One advantage 6f the researchsurvey over patent data is that
although a patent is registered, there is no assurancethat it is being used
whereas we do not need to raise the same question for researchexpend-
itures. We decided to enter R & D as a dummy variable - i.e., 1 for in-
dustries which performed researchfor others and zero for industrieswhich
did not engage in such contract work. Hopefully, at some future date,
there will be actual data on the value of R & D expenditures by indus-
try. However, at the moment, we feel that this is the last best solution
given the available information. The expected sign for the R & D dummy
is,of course,positive.
EPR. This variable measuresthe percent change in effective pro-
tection rates. Tariff protection is viewed as antithetical to efficient alloca-
tion of resourcesand therefore an obstacle to productivity growth. We have
argued above that the structure of tariff protection created incentives to
use excessiveamounts of intermediate inputs with correspondinglydysfunc-
tional impacts on TFP. In addition, some economists believe that high
tariffs lead to entrepreneurship behaviour patterns which exhibit com-
placency toward improvement in cost/efficiency and in product quality.
Firms (industries)with low productivity are permitted to survive whereas
many would be eliminated under competitive conditions. (Harberger, 1958;
Scitovsky, 1968). The expected signfor EPR is negative.
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EX. This variable measures the percentage of an industry's output
which is exported. Fo!lowing the same general rationale as in the discussion
for the EPR variable, the presumption is that industries that export, operate
in a more competitive environment, and are therefore more efficiency-
conscious. The expected sign is positive.
Table 9 presents the results of a multiple regression of TFP against
the explanatory variables listed above.
Table 9
Multiple RegressionCoefficients,
Total Factor ProductivityandSelectedIndependentVariables
Independent Expected Regression
Variable Sign Coefficient T-Value
CSIZE + .0064 3.043 ***
ECOST - .0952 -.871
MLA/T + 8.6925 2.541 **
INGDS - -.0949 1.687
MIGDS (%-) .0953 1.000
FEM/T - -13.1000 -2.772 **
EX/TN - 16.2681 1.803 *
PR/TN + .2182 1.331
SLVAR - -39.7240 -3.382 ***
R & D + .7937 1.222
EPR - -.0084 -I .495
EX + .0267 1.998 *
R (2) = .74
The results of the cross-section regression shown above confirm a num-
ber of our hypotheses. First, notice that the coefficients of ten of the twelve
independent variables have the expected sign. Five of the ten have t-values
which are significant at the 5 percent probability level or better. Of the
remainder, most have t-values greater than one. Three quarters of the inter-
industry variation in TFP is "explained" by reference to the factors in-
cluded here.
Economies of scale appears to be a significant determinant of TFP
growth. This is true for both internal (CSIZE) and external (MLA/T) scale
effects, which are statistically significant at the .01 and .05 probability
levels, respectively.
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Energy costs, while taking the right sign, does not exhibit a significant
coefficienL The implication is that the dysfunctional effects of the energy
price rise did not exert their effects through the production system. This
is not to deny, however, that rises in energy prices may have significant
impact on income levels, income distribution and on the pattern of inter-
industry final demand.
The coefficient for intermediate goods usage is negative, as expected,
but not significant at the .05 level. However, it is large enough (-1.69)
to suggestthe possibility of a negative relationship between changesin the
sham of intermediate goods in total input usage and TFP growth. On the
other hand, changes in imported intermediate goodsusage may be positively
related to TFP growth. Again, the t-value in this case is only 1.0. Butthe
implication, albeit weak, is that there may be some positive technological
transfer effects for industries dependent on imported inputs. The transfer
effects could be in the form of "embodied technology" or simply the
improved quality of intermediate goods.
The coefficient of the share of females in the workforce is negative
and significant at the .05 level. This variable is really a proxy for age and
education and therefore we feel that this result indicates that the latter
is positively associated with productivity improvement. This inference
is in agreement with findings elsewhere.
Changes in the ratio of production workers to the workforce (PR/TN)
are positively related to TFP performance, although the t-value is only
1.3. One possible interpretation of this result is to note that it is consistent
with the inference made that dependence on purchased intermediate pro-
ducts work against TFP growth. Taken together, the two results seem to
be implying that industries involved in only minor processing of materials
are likely to be unimpressive in terms of their productivity performance.
If true, this suggests that input structure is related to productivity per-
formance.
The significant coefficient for salary variation of production workers
(SLVAR) is evidence that wage structure which are tilted against pro-
duction workers contain a hidden cost in terms of productivity improve-
ment. This supports the view of some observers that managers here under-
estimate the effectiveness of well-designed wage structures in promoting
plant efficiency. It can also be interpreted as supporting the impact of
education and age on productivity change, since wage rates may be a proxy
for age and education.
The coefficient of the R & D index is positive, greater than one, but
not statistically significant. Given the deficiencies in our R & D data, this
result is not wholly unexpected. We continue to feel that R & D is a sig-
nificant determinant of TFP and we feel that given the data at our disposal,
these results are the best one could expect. We should note that the variable
EX/TN which measures the ratio of executives to the workforce is also
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positive and carries a t-value significant at the .10 level. The unexpected
positive sign may be interpreted as if EX/TN is a proxy for R & D. That
is, industries with a higher ratio of executives to total workforce may also
be those which conduct more R & D activities.
The last two variables deal with the impact of "outward" and "inward"
looking policies on TFP change. The variable EX, the shareof an industry's
output exported, has a positive coefficient significant at the .10 level.
Conversely, industries which have experienced large increasesin protective
tariffs (and hence are presumably domestic market-oriented) appear tO fare
poorly when measured against the criterion of productivity performance.
The latter inference is somewhat ambiguous, however, becausethe elasticity
coefficient is small (-.008) and the t-value is not statistically significant
although it is greater than unity. This generally confirms our expectations.
The relatively low t-value for degree of protection supports,our view that
tariff protection hinders productivity improvement not so much directly,
but indirectly through its stimulation of intermediate input consumption
as well as its tendency to reduce inducements to undertake R & D activities
within the industry.
To sum up this discussion of factors affecting productivity change,
we are really looking at three setsof factors. At the enterprise level, internal
economies of scale, better wage structures and improved input structures
all contribute to more rapidly rising TFP. At the industry or intermediate
level, external economies and more expenditures on R & D are helpful.
Finally, at the macro level, improved education and more outward looking
policies in regard to export promotion, improvement in the competitive
environment and reduction of tariffs (and import dependence) are all
important ways to advance TFP performance. It is noteworthy that no
single factor appears to dominate in explaining inter-industry differences
in TFP. Indeed, if the empirical evidence is taken at face value, it points
to the interaction of factors at all three levels - the micro or firm level,
the industry level and at the macro level. Perhapsthe most challengingtask
is not simply identifying the factors but finding institutional structures for
coordinating the appropriate policy mixes.
VIII. PRODUCTION PER UNIT OF INPUT
We have presented material on the pace and pattern of productivity
change by industry for the period 1956-1980 and for subperiods.We have
discusseda number of factors accounting for these trends. It is helpful
to bring this discussion together by discussingthe main trends in produc-
tion per unit of input for manufacturing in the aggregateand by examining
estimates of the quantitative contributions of each of these explanatory
factors to the record as a whole. Since we have already determined that
there are two major subperiods within the quarter-century covered by our
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study, our discussion will concentrate on explaining trends within those
two periods.
Estimates of production per unit of factor input are presented in Table
10. In the 1956-1970 period, production expanded at an annual rate of
10.2 percent, but inputs expanded faster - at 10.95 percent - so the re-
sidual isa negative -.74 percent. In the 1971-1980 period, production growth
fell to 6.59 percent per annum, but total factor input continued to grow
rapidly - at 8.91 percent - so that the residual expanded to a negative
-2.32 percent per annum. What are the factors which account for these
residuals and what is their relative importance?
Table 10
Sourcesof Declinein Productionper Unit of Input, 1957-1980
(Contributionto growth (decline)in percentagepoints)
1956-1970 1971-1980
Production 10.21 6.59
Total factor input 10.95 8.91
Labor 2.52 2.31
Employment 1.25 1,20
Hours -.10 -.10
Age/Sex .36 .21
Education 1.01 1.00
Capital 1.94 1.06
Fixed Assets 1.38 .82
Inventories .56 .24
Intermediate foods 6.49 5.5.4
Production per unit of
factor input -.74 -2.32
Inter-industry shift -.18 -1.41
Growth of government
corporation's -.02 - .18
Economiesof scale-internal ,04 .02
Economiesof scale,external -.03 .09
Increasein tariff (EPR) rate -.05 -.28
Intensity of demand effect-
labor only -.68 -.26
Changesin economicenviron-
mentand advancesin appllca-
tion of technicalknowledge -.18 -.30
Source: Measurementmethods anddata sourcesdescribedin text.
We have tried to •answer this question by bringing forth our findings
regarding the determinants of productivity change outlined in the previous
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pages. First, we measured the effects of inter-industry shifts, i.e., changes
within the industry composition of aggregate manufacturing which we
have shown were away from higher productivity industriesand toward the
expansion of lower productivity industries. Usingthe methodology outlined
in section IV, we estimate the effects of inter-industry shifts as-.18 percent
in the earlier period and -1.41 percent in the later period. Theseshiftscame
about as the result of a number of policies, including exchange controls,
changesin the structure of protection, and other types of intervention. By
and large, the negative impacts of inter-industry shift were side effects of
interventionist policies which were aimed at some other target. Hence, they
were usually overlooked by policymakers.
The growth of government corporations is estimated to account for
lossesof .02 percent per year in the earlier period and .18 percent in the
later period. This estimate is based on the share of corporate assetscon-
trolled at the close of each period together with the difference in govern-
ment and private corporate productivity performance as measured (and
discussed)in section IV. The growth in the negative contribution reflects
both the expansion of government-controlled assets in the second period,
along with a deterioration in the efficiency measuresrecorded by these
same enterprises. Indirectly, it represents part of the hidden cost of grow-
ing unemployment in the society.
Economies of scale-internal and external--account for +.01 percent
and +.11 percent contributions, respectively, to the residual in the two
periods. The substantially larger contributions in the second period reflect
the expansion of industry during the international commodity boom (and
associated) multiplier effects for domestic industry during the period 1971-
1976. After 1976, the situation changed completely, but the positive effects
of the boom dominate the subperiod totals. The estimates are based on
data for size of establishments combined with the cross-section elasticities
derived in section VII.
Increases in the rate of effective protection are estimated to account
for a decline of -.05 percent and -.28 percent, respectively, in the two
periods. The much higher figure for the secondperiod reflects the tariff
revision of 1973 which brought about a large increase for manufacturing
industries across the board. This effect is distinct from changesin the struc-
ture of protection by industry (within the manufacturing aggregate) which
is caught in the inter-industry shift effect. We have based this estimate on
Norma Tan's estimate of average EPR for all manufacturing in Power,
Bautista et aL (1979) and on the index of changing manufacturing tariff
rates for all manufacturing as prepared by Erlinda Medalla and contained
in Appendix E. It represents the dysfunctional impact of tariffs on decisions
for combining inputs in the proddction processand probably a "disincent-
ive" impact on entrepreneurial behaviour aswell.
We have included an estimate of intensity of demand effect for labor
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estimated by a method to be describedshortly. It was not necessaryto make
any estimate of the intensity with which capitaland intermediate goodswere
used. In the case of capital, our input measure already contains implicit
adjustments for quality and intensity of use. For intermediate goods, no
adjustment is necessarybecause if there is any "slack," it will be reflected
in inventory accumulation, which isalready counted undercapital. However,
our labor input estimatesrequire an adjustment for intensity of usefor two
reasons.First, we feel that our hours of work data are rough- they reflect
onlymajor changesin average work-week hours. Second, there is the pro-
pensity of entrepreneurs to "hoard" labor in slack times, which is well-
known, to say nothing of the obvious pressure that many corporations
(particularly government-affiliated) are under to provide employment,
especially in time of economic stress. Our method is similar to that used
by Denison, i.e., estimating intensity of demand by the ratio of worker
payroll to value-added and using this to derive an estimate of changesin
output per worker due to changes in intensity of demand. In this case,
however, we adjust the residual only by the share of labor input to total
factor inputs. The resultsshow a -.68 percent and -.26 percent adjustment
for the two subperiods, respectively. This reflects a chronic failure of
demand pressurethroughout the past quarter century. The smaller negative
figure for the latter oeriod is the result of the boom between 1971-1976
which was a considerable offset to the precipitous decline in effective
demand in the years after 1976, resulting from the end of the boom; the
piling up of foreign debt; and the near collapse of the domestic financial
system.
When the above items are all deducted from production per unit of
input, there remains a residual of +.18 percent and-.30 percent, respect-
ively, to be explained for the two subperiods.We feel that this unexplained
residual can be traced mainly to two factors which we have already dis-
cussed,but which we cannot quantify. One is the application of technical
knowledge which we have indicated is undoubtedly of small magnitude
but which is growing. This inference is justified by our own cross-section
regressionresults which indicated a positive relationship between TFP and
R & 13 expenditures. This inference is also supported by the findings of
Medalla, Mikkelsen and Evenson (1982) in regardto the increase in domestic
patents in recent years. On the other hand, we have already explained the
reasonswhy increased intervention by the political authorities in recent
years has had substantial dysfunctional effects on the incentive system to
employ resources efficiently throughout the economy, particularly in
manufacturing. In the earlier period, intervention was confined more to
exchange controls and tariff changes. In later years, it became more wide-
rangingand was embodied in the Board of Investment policies, and ad hoc
intervention involving duty-free imports, special borrowing privileges,sub-
sidized interest rates, and the like. Hence, the expanding significance of
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this item. in short, we feel that the advances in knowledge application
item was probably positive in both periods. However, in both periods, its
positive effects appear to have been more than offset (particularly in the
post - 1970 period), by ad hoc and extra-legal interventionist policies.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Total factor productivity growth in manufacturing, after adjusting all
inputs for quality, averaged -:71 percent per annum during the period
1956-1970, and --2.23 percent from 1971-1980. Preliminary data for
1980-1983 indicate a further decline, probably to the-2.5 to-3.0 percent
area. The implications of this for national development are clear and am-
biguous. Considering that the average rate of TFP growth in agriculture
from 1950-1970 was +0.7 percent and that this rate in all probability did
not exceed 1.5 percent per year since 1970 even with the beneficial effects
of the Green Revolution, then the clear implication is that the productivity
gains in agriculture have been fully offset by productivity declines in
manufacturing over the past quarter-century. From the mid-fifties through
the sixties, there may have been a small net gain in agriculture and man-
ufacturing combined. But since 1970, the annual productivity gains in
agriculture have consistently been more than offset by declines in TFP
in manufacturing. The implications for the entire economy are equally
stark. Since manufacturing output is roughly the size of agricultural out-
put, and since the available data on partial productivity indices indicate
that-productivity in the services sector is advancing no faster than man-
ufacturing, and probably slower, then TFP for the economy as a whole
has most likely been declining consistently since the early seventies. We
cannot be sure of the exact date that this deterioration began, but it is
somewhere between 1970-1974. The rate of decline accelerated significant-
ly after 1975.
Intra-industry Performance. There was considerable dispersion in the
productivity performance among industries. Food, beverages, tobacco,
apparel and wood products all had average annual rates of growth of TFP
of one percent or more per year. Wood products, footwear, other chemicals,
and plastics recorded rates of about one-half of one percent or less. The
rest - over one-half of the industries - registered negative rates of TFP
growth. Some of the latter group showed remarkably large negative rates -
like glass and leather with -3.3 and -2.4 percent, respectively. A small
minority of industries with positive rates (food processing, tobacco, bev-
erages, apparel and wood products) exerted greater weight on the sectoral
total, however, because of their size. Together, they account for a third of
total manufacturing production. On the whole, the performance of indivi-
dual industries was substantially superior to that of the manufacturing
sector taken as a whole, because of the existence of an inter-industry shift
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effect which accounted for annual net declines in TFP of-.18 percent
during 1956-1970 and -1.41 percent for the period 1971-1980.
Of the industries that performed better than average, some are import
substitution and some are export-oriented. The successful import subs-
titution industries include food, apparel, beverages and tobacco. These
are what we have called "natural" impQrt substitution industries pro-
ducing goods for final demand with high income elasticities at current
levels of Philippine per Capita income. Their performance is in contrast
to the remainder of import substitution industries (suchas transport equip-
ment, glass and fabricated metals) which either produce goods with low
income elasticities or which produce for intermediate demand which is not
growing rapidly and where the cascading tariff structure is often dysfunc-
tional in its growth effects. The net upshot of the experience of individual
industries is that some import substitution industries and some export in-
dustries performed better than average in regard to productivity perform-
ance; some of both also performed poorly.
Government Corporations. We have already pointed out the importance
of inter-industry shift in explaining the difference between the perform-
ance of individual industries and all manufacturing. Another, but lessappre-
ciated shift, is the change in corporate ownership. Government-owned
corporations, which controlled only 14 percent of corporate assetsin the
early sixties, increased their share to nearly one-third by 1982. But their
record of output per unit of input has been declining steadily during the
last decade relative to that of private corporations. Thus this ownership
change also accounted for considerable drag on productivity growth in the
manufacturing sector.
Distribution of Productivity Gains. Productivity gains are often distri-
buted through the price system in the form of lower prices to consumers.
That is, in those industries experiencing more rapid TFP advance, prices
fall or rise less than average. The reverse is the case for productivity lagging
industries. However, there are important exceptions to this rule. One is
when the industry produces predominantly for export. In this case, prices
are set in the export market, which generally means passingon most or all
of the TFP gain to entrepreneurs in the form of windfall profits when export
prices are favorable, and passingon the gains to consumers in the importing
country when export prices are unfavorable. Industries with above average
rates of TFP improvement also exhibit correspondingly larger increases in
production via the decline in prices just noted. There are two important
exceptions here. One is the caseof industries exporting almost all of their
output where shipments are under a quota, as in the case of sugar. The
second is in industries with high rates of protection. This has the effect of
allowing the entrepreneur to restrict output and yet maintain his dominant
market position, thereby enabling him to retain a substantial share of the
TFP dividend. The market situation here is similar to that in monopolistic
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competition. TFP growth also exerts a powerful effect on employment
expansion. However, we found no relationship between changes in real
wage rates and TFP change. Actually, this last result was expected in view
of the large volume of surpluslabor existing in this economy. We conclude
here that the distribution process for productivity gains - such as they
are - is being disrupted partly by the intervention of government industrial
protection, promotion and industry monopolization policies. The con-
sistently negative TFP growth rates which we observedfor the manufac-
turing sector have had two damaging consequencesaside from their effect
on national growth rates. The first is on domestic terms of trade between
manufacturing and other sectors. Using our cross-sectionelasticities, we
estimate that between 1956-1980, the average annual decline in TFP re-
sulted in an average annual increase in manufacturing goods prices of .87
percent which over the entire twenty-five years amounts to an increaseof
24.2 percent in pricesof domestic manufactures. Assumingfor the moment
that productivity change in agriculture was +.7 percent per year, and that
the elasticity coefficient of agriculture prices with respect to TFP was the
same as in manufacturing, the terms of trade of agriculture would decline
by 38 percent (24.2 + 13.8) over the entire period. This is in addition to
the impact of other macro economic policies, such as tariffs, which could
raise the prices of domestic manufactures relative to the prices of other
goods.
impact of Tariffs on Industrial Growth and Productivity. We have
already referred to the adverse impact of industrial protection policieson
the mechanism for distributing productivity gains.The conventional view
is that protectionism produces its dysfunctional effects exclusively through
its impact on entrepreneurial incentives. Inefficient enterprises with low
productivity are permitted to survive which would be eliminated under
competitive market conditions. The results,of our investigation suggestto
us that this is not the only and indeed probably not even the most import-
ant, dysfunctional impact of protection on manufacturing industries..We
now wish to point to several other impacts, not previously mentioned
and apparently not recognizedin the literature on protection.
a) Depending on how the tariff is structured in regard to inputs of
capital and intermediate goods, and the price movements (ex tariffs) for
these inputs, the tarift will impact directly on the input structure of in-
dustries. In the Philippine case, decreasing effective protection rates on
intermediate inputs coupled with a constant EPR for capital goods and a
rapidly rising interest rates,shifted producerstowards substitution of inter-
mediate goods for both capital and labor. The result, in many industries,
was a voraciousdemand for intermediate production, much of it imported,
which helped create a foreign exchange bottleneck for a// industry. This
in turn created disruptions and discontinuities in input supply which were
transmitted directly to industry output growth across the board and there-
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fore on productivity changethroughout the sector.
b) We have found that tariffs, by creating a monopolisticenvironment,
interrupted the distribution of productivity gains to consumersvia lower
prices and allowed entrepreneurs in the protected industriesto retain the
TFP dividend. Unfortunately, the resulting windfall was not coupled with
any requirement for directing the proceeds to researchand development
which would help raise productivity in the protected industry. Given the
nature of the policy framework, the windfall had no positive effect on pro-
ductivity growth. This is not the result of any "backward bending" entre-
preneurial effort curve, but simply the result of government intervention
of a poorly designedtype. In every casewe have seen, the Philippine entre-
preneurs reacted rationally to the signals they received from the tariff
structure. Unfortunately, they were often the wrong signals. Worse yet,
in all caseswe have seen, the price of the policy error was paid for by (a)
consumersin the form of higher prices and/or restric.tedoutput, (b) labor
in the form of a slowergrowth of employment than would otherwise have
transpired and, (c) by supplying industries which would have been able
to expand their deliveries faster had the demand of their customersgrown
more rapidly. In other words, slow productivity growth hasgreatly weak-
ened the backward linkage effects of production growth of the manufac-
turing sector.
c) When value-added is estimated in real terms by the use of single
deflation, the likely result is an overestimation of the value-added aggre-
gate. This occurs becausetariff protection affects the price of both final
output and intermediate inputs, i.e., it raisesfinal prices and lowers inter-
mediate goods' prices below what they otherwise would be. This occurs
because of the "cascading" nature of these protection systems. Where
single deflation is used, the implicit tariff increasedue to increasedselling
prices of final goodsis eliminated; but the reduction in intermediate goods
prices (due to reduced prices and sometimes negative protection) is not.
We estimated resulting overstatement of value-added in the Philippine
case as equal to 35 percent in 1980 compared to 1956. In our opinion,
manufacturing value-addedis overstatedin the official statistics.
d) Where the industrial sector is a substantialpart of national economic
activity, growth will also be overstated, both for the sector and for the
national income aggregate.The overstatement in the Philippine caseamounts
to about one and one-fourth percent per year for the manufacturing sector.
Obviously, growth ratesof individual industrieswill also be over- or under-
stated in the absenceof a correction applied to input prices, and probably
to a larger degreethan aggregatemanufacturing becauseof the high degree
of variability of tariff ratesby individual industry.
Contribution to Employment. One of the major ways that produc-
tivity gains are distributed is through increasesin employment. In an eco-
nomy with widespread unemployment/underemployment, the potential
in this direction is clear. Considering that TFP in manufacturing has been
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zero or negative for much of the past quarter-century, it is not surprising
that the annual increase in manufacturing employment has only been
marginally above the growth rate of the non-agricultural labor force. For
example, the non-agricultural labor force grew by nearly 5 percent per
annum from 1970-1980. Employment in manufacturing grew by appro-
ximately 8 percent. However, production per worker fell by about 2 percent
during the same period. Over the long-run, the deficit reflected in the excess
of employment growth over labor productivity growth must be corrected,
and that implies a period of labor absorption considerably lower than labor
force growth. Actually, such a correction did take place during 1981-1984
when the rate of employment absorption in manufacturing became negative.
This was accompanied by a rapid increase in unemployment. The main
point here is that unless TFP in manufacturing rises to at least 2 percent
per year, there is no possibility of the manufacturing sector making any
significant contribution to the reduction in unemployment. The reason
is clear: given an elasticity coefficient of employment with respect to pro-
duction of less than unity, manufacturing production cannot secure non-
labor inputs fast enough, in the absenceof TFP growth, to expand employ-
ment much faster than labor force growth.
Determinants of Intra-industry Productivity Change. We investigated
the relationship between TFP performance in two dozen industries at the
3-digit level and fourteen different factors which theory suggestsmight be
significant in explaining movements in TFP. A number of these variables
proved to be promising in explaining industry differences in productivity
performance. Tariff protection emerged as negatively associated while
export expansion was positively associated with superior TFP performance,
lending further empirical support to our inferences derived from time
series analysis. 2here appears to be significant internal and external eco-'
nomies of scale for most industries. The rise in energy.cost was not the
drag on TFP that we expected. These industries which are more dependent
on energy inputs generally did not do as well as others, but they did not
have markedly inferior records of TFP improvement. Improvements in
labor quality- as measured by age, sex and education - are closely asso- I
ciated with TFP growth. Variation in salary levels, which favors operators,
seems helpful in improving productivity. R & D activity appears positively
related to TFP changes, though the evidence at this stage is not easy to
interpret due to problems of measurement of R & D activities at the industry
level.
Rate of Return and Capital Utilization. Our evidence on the net r_te of
return on manufacturingcapital indicates a significant drop from about 15
percent in the late fifties to around 7-9 percent a decade later and then to
a figure of 6 to 7 percent by the late seventies. Thesedeclines reflect two
things: a decline in capital utilization rates and a drop in the quality of
capital services. "Quality" as used here includes design of capital install-
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ations, organization of capital inputs in production, etc. We separated
utilization rate effects and found that these were responsible for about four
percentage points (roughly one-half) of the overall decline in the rate of
return from 1960 to 1980. The impact of falling capital utilization rates
has been particularly apparent since 1975. It is difficult to explain the re-
, maining decline of four percentage points. We feel, however, that this
reflects mainly the impact of increased government intervention in the
economy since the early seventies as well as the increased centralization
of economic decision making.
Productivity, Prices and the Balance of Payments. Where a small open
economy experiences a steady and significant deterioration in TFP, it will
become virtually impossible to stabilize the external accounts. In the Phil-
ippines, TFP in manufacturing has been declining at the rate of roughly
two percent per year since 1975. Output per unit of intermediate input
(most of which is imported) has been declining at the same rate. We have
shown that productivity declines of this magnitude are inevitably reflected
in increases in domestic prices of nearly equal proportion. This process
induces demand-switching by local consumers from local to imported
products. Even though an appropriate fiscal/monetary policy mix may
restrain growth in aggregate demand, the demand for imports will still rise.
Of course, in the short-run, favorable international price movements may
reduce domestic costs and raise those of foreign producers: But in the
long-run, the effects of international price movements will be neutral at
best. Then a steady deterioration of the domestic currency will emerge
as the price of stable equilibrium in the current account.
Negative rates of TFP growth in manufacturing have also exerted adverse
effects on the capital account of the balance of payments by triggering a
capital outflow via a change in relative rates of return. To the extent that
negative TFP growth rates are the result of misallocation of capital and
intermediate good inputs, the rate of return to capital declines. This in
itself should cause (ceteris paribus) an outflow on capital account if it is
not offset by an equi-proportionate rite in the rate of return in another
sector of the domestic economy of equivalent size. 18[ We have shown
how the rate of return on manufacturing capital fell below the U.S. Treas-
ury bill rate after 1978, and we argue that this was a major factor in ex-
plaining the dramatic outflow of long-and short-term capital from the
Philippines in the late seventies and early eighties. The steady decline of
industrial productivity in domestic industry was probably the main reason
for this state of affairs by bringing about a fall in the rate of return, in
Philippine industry, to the point that it was below the U.S. Treasury bill
rate after 1978.
18/Give n the evidence, this seems quite unrealistic. Therefore, we proceed under the assumption
that the decline in the manufacturing rate of return was representative of rates of return throughout
non-agricultural industries.
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X. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the recent disappointing performance, TFP growth in the in-
dustrial sector can be raised substantially. There is a variety of measures
that can be undertaken to improve industrial productivity in this country.
Moreover, we are convincedthat a dramatic turnaround is absolutely essen-
tial because no package of macroeconomic and/or monetary policies is,
likely to be effective in the absenceof such a turnaround. However, we
caution against the view that there is one key policy that will changepro-
ductivity performance in industry. Our results demonstrate unequivocably
that neither tariff reform alone, nor development of export industries
alone, nor any other single policy is sufficient to change the presentcourse
of events. This is not to deny that some policies may be more important
than others. It is just that an effective solution requires a well-balanced
mix of policy changes.
(1) If productivity growth is to become an operational dimension of
economic policy, an obvious first task is to develop the Capability of
monitoring productivity change. Occasionalstudiesare not enough. Regular
estimates of productivity change, at least by major sector, are necessary
partly to track recent overall performance, and partly as a guide for assess-
ment of growth in particular sub-sectorsor industriesof the largereconomy.
Monitoring implies up-to-date estimates,published periodically. The annual
estimates of non-agricultural productivity changepublishedby the American
Productivity Center isan example of what we have in mind.
(2) In the past, macro investment decisions have been made largely
if not entirely without reference to either the actual record or future pro-
spects for productivity growth in different industries. Unlessan industry
can show prospects of significant TFP growth over the longer term, the
channeling of investment funds to it can hardly be justified no matter
what the expected foreign exchange savings, employment creation, etc.
In the long run, all these anticipated social •benefits of investment rely
heavily on TFP growth to produce the •desiredeffects. Therefore, we feel
that investment strategies at the macro level must consider the potential
for productivity improvement. In making macro investment policy, we
•must of course keep clear the distinction between productivity and pro-
fitability, the latter depending on price-cost relationships as well as the
physica! productivity of inputs. The findings of this study show that inter-
industry shift, which has been orchestrated in considerable part by govern-
ment investment policy, has had a dysfunctional impact on productivity
growth in the past. We feel that this is both unfortunate and unnecessary,
and .could be corrected with a correspondingly favorable impact on the
productivity performance of the aggregatemanufacturing sector.
(3) We feel strongly that the poor record of productivity growth in
manufacturing• is intimately connected with the distress• of this country's
financial system. Too large a share of the system's credit resourceshave
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been extended to industrieswhose productivity record is among the weakest
in the entire manufacturing sector. Some way must be found to incorporate
an assessmentof potential productivity performance into the overall assess-
ment of credit worthiness by financial institutions. This would provide
additional incentive for non-financial enterprises to improve their per-
formance. The Central Bank, too, is going to have to include this in its
considerations regarding the restructuring of the country's internal and
external debt positions since, as we have shown, poor productivity per-
formance eventually affects rates of return which in turn react negatively
on international capital flows and the country's balance of payments
position.
(4) Restructuring of the tariff system is another area where macro
policy should be improved. In many cases,the highest protection was pro-
vided to those industries which had the least impressive records in regard
to TFP growth. This was not a/ways the case,e.g., we note that high levels
of protection were given to the beverage industry which really did not
need them. But the inverse relationship between protection rate and pro-
ductivity performance was sufficiently pronounced to account for a signi-
ficant share of productivity decline in manufacturing. Tariff protection,
where used, should be limited to those industries which hold out genuine
promise for substantial gains in TFP. This has always been a key element
in the administration of tariffs from the standpoint of the infant industry
approach.
(5) The conventional wisdom seemsto hold out prospects for a drama-
tic improvement in TFP with a further expansion of the export-oriented
industrialization policy. We believe that such a policy has the potential
for favorable impacts on TFP growth. However, the evidence suggests
that this policy mix alone will not produce effects of the magnitude gen-
erally believed necessary, and therefore should not be relied upon as the
centerpiece of a solution. It is a necessarybut not a sufficient condition
for a successfulre-industrialization policy.
(6) A framework of incentives for the improvement of overall efficiency
must be developed for government corporations. Both government-owned
and government-affiliated corporations appear to be operating under an
incentive system that places profitability far behind provision of employ-
ment and perhaps other social/political objectives.But as have been clearly ,
shown, pursuit of these objectives which allows output per unit of input
to decline, is counter-productive in anything but the most trivially short
period. Moreover, since audit procedures are uneven at best, measurement
of resourcesgoing into these enterprises is extremely difficult, making even
the productivity monitoring function nearly impossible in a number of
cases. Government enterprises, even when producing socially desirable
outputs, must be provided with an accounting framework and a set of
fiscal incentives to improve their productivity record. This is particularly
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important now that these units have become the owners of a significant
share of manufacturing assets.
(7) The importance of research and development to productivity change
is well-documented for a number of countries. In the past, Philippine
manufacturing has relied heavily on imported technology, implemented
in local plants with a minimum degree of change, resulting in a heavy de-
pendence on imported inputs. The evidence presented here does not in-
dicate that this is a promising strategy for TFP growth. Those industries
most dependent on imported inputs do not have records of productivity
growth superior to others as one would expect if productivity gains in
American and Japanese industry were being transferred to local indus-
try via the link of import-dependency. In fact, the import-dependent
industries often have inferior records of TFP growth. Hence, the need
to develop the country's internal capability for the adaptation of scientific
and technological knowledge to industrial uses, and to encourage private
industry to undertake research and development activities. The Philippines
has the largest number of trained scientists per capita in all Southeast Asia.
Yet these potentially valuable human skills are allowed to remain under-
utilized. Underemployment of trained technologists is so widespread that
thousands emigrate each year to other countries in search of useful employ-
ment. A program can and should be developed to organize available domestic
resources (human and non-human) to advance the technology-adaptative
capability of domestic industry.
To accomplish such a task requires nothing lessthan the institution-
alization of R & D. At present, some R & D is carried on, both within
the government and in private industry, as demonstrated by the growth
of patent applications. However, it is necessary to organize these sporadic
efforts much better, so that technological improvement becomesboth more
widespread and more rapid. To accomplish this requires some institution-
building. In short, it is necessary to establish an institution whose major
function is the coordination of existing efforts (both private and govern-
ment) at scientific research/adaptation for industrial purposes, and the
undertaking of those functions not being undertaken by others. The follow-
ing functions are essential to a successful R & D program:
a) Monitoring of foreign technology - This is different from the
monitoring of technological change mentioned earlier. It involves tracking
technological developments in other countries, bringing them to the atten-
tion of appropriate industrial leaders, assisting in working out the basicsof
adaptation as necessary (and, in conjunction with other institutions where
possible).
b) Assessment of the economics of technological change and improve-
ment - This involves the investigation of the economics of technical adapt-
ation and development. Technologies which may indeed be superior in one
economic environment may be inferior in another. Further, what changes
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in domestic economic environment (pricing, incentive system, etc.) would
be adequate and/or desirable to introduce certain types of technology?
c) Development of domestic R & D capacity and activities generally -
R & D capacity in industry may require certain changes in awareness on
the part of entrepreneurs, and some changes in attitudes among worker
organizations. Where necessary, these matters have to be analyZed, con-
sidered and possible solutions discussed with the appropriate existing or-
ganizations.
d) Some changes in macro policy may be desirable in order to stimulate
R & D activities by industrial firms - Such things as changes in the depre-
ciation rates, various tax measures, and investment incentives related to the
introduction of new technology may fall under this heading.
e) Monitoring of productivity change in non-agriculture -Since some
efforts at productivity measurement are already on-going, this function
may be limited to coordination of the work done by other institutions.
The institution created to house these various functions should be
capable of extensive dialogue with both government agencies/personnel
and private entities/personnel and with international organizations. This
seems to preclude a purely government or privately-controlled institution.
Instead, it should be an institution formally independent of government
yet established with its approval. This set-up appears to be the most effect-
ive setting with respect to sponsorship.
These functions to be performed by such type of an institution brings
to mind scientific and technologically-oriented institutions such as the
International Rice and Research Institute (I RRI) at Laguna and the Korean
Institute for Science and Technology (KIST) at Seoul. The parallels are
there. But simple imitation has to be resisted because the object of what is
being proposed is the creation of an organization that would serve industry's
scientific-technical needs and not vice-versa.
(8) Economies of scale were shown to be particularly relevant to pro-
ductivity growth. There is obviously tremendous room for improving ex-
ternal economies in this country. Judging from scattered evidence on the
domestic cost of moving commodities - particularly in the major cities
the transport system is characterized by very high unit costs. Improvements
in the physical facilities of the ports and the domestic transport system
are needed, along with streamlining in their administration.
(9) Our conclusions regarding the importance of internal economies
of scale suggest the need to assist firms in moving toward optimum size.
This means much more, however, than simply enlarging establishments.
It implies the review of available technology, adoption of appropriate
• organizational forms -- both for physical plant and administrative functions -
and review of other aspects of production. This should be done through
the expansion of firm-level consultative activities, such asthose now render-
ed by the Productivity and Development Center, as well as other semi-
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governmentand private organizations.
(10) The abovementioned points are venues which the government
and its agenciescan take in order to help increase industrial productivity
growth. There are also some things which the government should cease
doing. That is the continuous intervention in the economic system, par-
ticularly the ad hoc kind of intervention which grants a duty-free import
here and givesspecialencouragementfor a particular loan there. Economic
actors must have a body of rules to pattern their conduct on. Continuous
changesin the rules or the granting of a continuous stream of exceptions,
which amounts to the same thing will gradually paralyze both the govern-
ment bureaucracy and private entrepreneurs. Decision making becomes
exceedingly risky under such intervention and doing nothing often be-
comes the wisest course of action. This is not to say that operating rules
of the system should not be improved whenever possible.Indeed, a number
of suggestionsfor such improvements have been given. Still, day-to-day
permanence of a consistentsystem has to stand and economic actors must
be convinced of both its permanence and overall consistency in order for
the economic system to function efficiently. Sociologists may question
whether such a framework can evolve here, given the client-patron personal
relationship Structure in Philippine society. Nevertheless, a framework for
economically consistent action remains an indispensable condition for
improved industrial efficiency. In the long run, improved resourceallocation
providesthe foundation for productivity improvement. "
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Appendix A
Production and Inputs for Manufacturing Establishments
with 20 or More Workers, by Industry, 1956 - 1980
The reason for this appendix is to explain in detail the procedure for estimating
output and inputs for establishments of a given size over the period 1956-1980. As
explained in the text, the size of establishment covered by the Census and Surveys of
Manufactures has varied over time. In recent years in particular, the NCSO has shifted
from reporting characteristics of firms with 20 or more workers (or 5 or more workers)
to all establishments, i.e., with 1 or more workers. The task, then, is to delineate a
method of converting output and inputs as reported for all establishments to the levels
corresponding to firms with 20 or more (or 5 or more) workers.
This appendix would be unnecessary if the Census or Surveys reported, even for a
few benchmark dates, the major economic variables for establishments of different
employment size. Unfortunately, over a period of 25 years, there is not a single issue
of the Census/Survey which reports the variables for all sizes of establishments, i.e.,
920 workers, _- 10 workers, _ 5 workers and _ 1 worker. We were fortunate in being
furnished a complete print-out of the results of the 1975 Census for all these size classes
of establishments. Our efforts to secure the same breakdown for 1980 were unsu.ccessful,
however, apparently because the 1980 results have not yet been completely c'omputer-
ized. In any event, we were faced with the task of developing a method to extend the
19"/5 results to the period 1976-1980, and possibly beyond.
The importance of securing reliable estimates for firm sizes is based on two con-
siderations. First, any time series which ignores the size Of establishment will contain
significant bias depending on whether the employment size cut-off is being lowered or
raised: an upward bias when the latter is lowered and a downward bias when employ-
ment size is raised. Such spurious shifts in output will create spurious shifts in any pro-
ductivity measures derived from these estimates. Second, because the structure of in-
puts varies with size of firm, a change in size coverage is accompanied, ceteris paribus,
with a shift in productivity. For example, output per worker varies positively with size
of firm, while output per unit of capital tends to vary inversely.
In correcting the Census/Survey data for coverage, we followed three general prin-
ciples which were formulated after extensive experimentation with the raw data: (1)
the relationship between the share of output/input covered varies systematically (but
not linearly) with the proportion of establishments covered, (2) the relationship between
the proportion of e,stablishments covered varies systematically but not linearly with
employment size; and (3) both sets of relationships are unique for certain industries;
hence, the necessity of estimation procedures which recognize the possibility of inter.
industry differences in the above relationships. That is to say, we estimate these relation-
ships for certain industries individually while for other industries, it is possible to treat
them together as a group, because they are essentially homogeneous as regards size of
establishment on the one hand and the proportion of significant economic variable
Coverage on the other.
We will now illustrate our estimation procedure for production of manufacturing"
firms with 20 or more workers for 1975. We will then compare this estimate to actual
production Of such firms as shown in the printout prepared for this project by the NCSO.
The first step is to isolate the three industries in which most of the small firms are
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clustered. For these industries,we take a fixed ratio of largeestablishmentsto total
establishments.
Number- All Number - Large
Industry Establishments Establishments
( 20 Workers )
Food (31] -12) 27,232 541 (.0199)
Apparel (322) 27,594 150 (.0055)
Woodproducts (332) 2,610 156 (.0148)
TOTAL 57,436 850 (.0148)
We have now estimated 850 establishmentsin the food, apparel and wood products
industries as being in the "large establishments" group. This was done on the basisof
fixed coefficients becausethe ratio of large to all establishments was so small. However,
for the remainder Of industries, the ratio is by no means small, and for these other in-
dustries,we needa more _phisticated technique.
We fit a function over a cross section of industries in which the cumulative percent
of establishmentsexcluded is a function of (N/E) the number of workers per establish-
ment and (FA) the value of fixed assets.The resulting equation is
C = 25.128 Ig N/E + 5.424 Ig 1/FA2
For establishmentsof averagesize20 worker this yield
C = 25.128 ('3.0) + 5.424 (2.338)
= 88.068
That is to say 88.068 percent of establishments in industries other than food, apparel
and wood products are excluded from establishment total when considering only large
establishments.
The total of large establishments for all industries is then computed as follows:
*For thesethreeindustries,the percentageof large stablishmentsis osmallthatit isstatlstic-
allynot feasibleto useanestimatingfunction.Moreover,evenif thepercentageschangesfromperiod
to period,theimpactof suchchangeson theoverallnumberofestablishmentsismostlikelyto bein*
significant.
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Largeestablishmentsin Food,
Appareland WoodProducts 850
Largeestablishmentsin the
remainderof industries
(19,855) X (1 -.88086) 2,366
Total of largefirms, all industries 3,216
The estimate3,216 comparesto the NCSO printout figure of 3,244 or a difference
of 0.8 percent.
Now we can proceedto estimate the shareof production reportedfor all establish-
ments representedby this proportion of large establishments.For this purpose,we
utilized the following relationshipderivedfrom a crosssectionfit:
Pex = _.(Z - C)
= .670 (. 119) = .079
Where Pex is the value of production excludedfrom the productionof all establish-
mentsand £ is an estimatedcoefficient.C is asdefinedabove.
Total productionof firms with 20 or moreworkers, therefore, is (1 - .079) multi-
plied by reported production of all establishmentsor (1 - .079) P55,470 = P51,088.5
million. Correspondingvaluesof other variablessuch as value added, investmentex-
penditures,etc., areobtainedin a similarmanner.
Estimates of the major variables for establishmentswith 20 or more workers by
industryare shown in the following table.
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APPENDIX B
PRODUCERS' PRICE INDEX FOR MANUFACTURING, BY INDUSTRY,
FOR ESTABLISHMENTS WITH 20 OR MORE WORKERS
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Appendix B
Producers' Price Index for Manufacturing_ by Industry,
for Establishments with 20 or More Workers
Census and Survey of Manufactures data on production are in current prices. For
purposes of productivity measurement, we need to convert them into constant prices.
Previous investigators have utilized the wholesale price index of the Central Bank
(WPICB) for i:,urposes of deflating manufacturing output. However, this index has several
shortcomings as a manufacturing deflator. They are: (a) its breakdown follows a com-
modity classification which cannot be converted into an industry classification (for
most industries) on the basis of available information; (b) it includes both manufactured
as well as non-processed commodities (e.g., copper ore, cereal grains); (c) the weights
used reflect the volume of transactions in wholesale markets rather than the output
of manufacturing industrieS; and (d) it is computed by a formula which is not consistent
with our method of measuring output.
The national accounts show an implicit price index for manufacturing for recent
years. The implicit index is the result of a combination of price and physical quantity
series for all manufacturing and individual industries at the two-digit level. However,
little information is available on the procedures used to derive either the specific physical
quantity and price series used or the methods employed to combine them. Since our
primary need was for a deflator at the three-digit level, and because the actual price
records were available, we constructed a producers price index for individual and all
manufacturing annually for the period 1956-1980.
The index is a Leypeyres type with 1972 base Year weights. We chose 1972 as the
base year because there was a Census of Manufactures taken then. We could have used
1961, 1967, or 1975. We felt that 1961 was a little early. That leaves three to choose
from, We decided on 1972 because (a) it catches some of the petroleum price increase,
but not all and (b) it is not the crest of a boom (as in 1975).'The index is given by the
well-known formula:
_' PZt +I QIt
i
It+ 1 =
pit (_t
i
where I is the price index, P and Q are price and quantity, respectively, of the ith
commodity and the subscripts indicate time. The commodity prices were obtained from
the Economic Research Department of the Central Bank. These were converted to price
relatives (19'72 = 100) for each of the approximately 300 commodities. Commodities
were combined by industry (at the 3-digit level) by the use of weights based on gross
value added as obtained from the 1972 Census of Manufactures. Each industry price
index was weighted by the ratio of industry value added to value added for all manufac-
turing from the same census and combined into a general price index for all manufac-
turing. The classification of commodities by industry followed the cross classification
code of the Central Bank relating commodities to industries. We tested the resulting
index for sensitivity to weights by calculating index using 1975 and 1967 weights for
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the period of dramatic price rise, i.e., 1972 to 1980. The differencebetweenboth the
1972/1975 and 1972/1967 waslessthan five percentineachcase.
The difference betweenour producer price index and the WPICB is, however,not
insignificant.Generally, ours risesfaster. For example, with 1972 as the baseyear, ours
risesto 378.7 while the WPICB increasesfor 347.1 in 1980 - a differenceof 1.1 percent
per year. Part of this differenceisbecausefood grainsaresubsidizedandriserather slow-
ly; part is due to the difference in weights.A third reasonis the differencein formula.The
WPICB is computed (for an individual industry) asa weightedgeometricmean of price
relatives(StatisticalBulletin, 1978, p. 21).
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APPENDIX C
INDEX OF CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN MANUFACTURING,
1956_1980
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Appendix C
Index of CapacityUtilization in Manufacturing
1956 - 1980
This appendix •describesthe methods usedto derive the capital utilization index
and briefly discussesthe meaningof the results.The index is basedon data indicating
expenditurefor fuelsandfor electric powerfound in variousissuesof the Manufacturing
Censusand of the Survey of Manufactures.Expendituresin current pricesare deflated
to derive expendituresof manufacturingestablishmentsfor fuels and electricpower in
1972 prices, annually for the period 1956 to 1980. The price index used to deflate
fuels is the producer price index for petroleum as shown in Appendix B. The price
index for electric power is basedon the scheduleof commercial/industrialratesas fur_
nishedby MERALCO. The latter index is shown incolumn(1) Of the tablethat follows.
Deflation by use of these indicesresults in the estimatesof expendituresfor fuelsand
electricpower inconstant(1972) priceswhich areshownin columns(2)and (3).
Columns(2) and (3) are then combinedto obtain aggregate xpendituresfor energy
in constantprices,and the result is shownin column (4). Note that in someyears,NCSO
did not report fuel and/or electric power expenditures,making it necessaryto inter-
polate. The interpolationshave beenmadeafter taking into considerationthe changing
mix of fuels and electric power inputs. This was done with the help of data on fuel
and electric power prices,whereby the fuel/power input mix was made a function of
the fuel price/powerpriceratio.
From this point, we move directly to the desiredcapital utilization index. •First,
we convert our expendituresfor energy (column 4) into an index with 1972 as base
year. This is shown in column (5). Then we convertour estimateof capital stock into
an index, alsowith 1972 as baseyear. This is shown in column (6). By dividingcolumn
(5) by_column (6) we arriveat the indexof capitalutilization, which is shownin column
(7). It is important to observethat the index shown in column (7) showsonly changes
in the capital utilization rate. It does not indicate the level of capital utilization. For
example, when the index declinesfrom 100.0 in 1972 to 77.7 in 1980, therewas a
declineof 22.3 percent in capacity utilization duringthat period.•The index doesnot,
however, say anything about what the level of capacity utilization was in, say, 1980.
The levelmight havebeeneither more or lessthan 77.7 percent.
Bautista(1974) hasinvestigatedthe levelof capital utilization for selectedindustries
and for all manufacturing. He utilized electric •motor utilization rates which he then
converted to capital time utilization rates. His most recent time utilization rate for
1972 is 61.7 percent. If we link our capital utilization index to his time utilization
rate, the result isthe following:
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Time Utilization Rate of CapitalStock
Year All Manufacturing (in percent)
1972 61.7
62..5197.3
1974 63.2
1975 63.5
1976 60.2
1977 57.5.
1978 53.8
1979 51.2
1980 47.9
These estimates are revealing in two respects.They indicate that the time utiliza-
tion rate rose durin?_the commodity boom of 1972-1975, but only modestly, peaking
at 63.5 percent in 1975. Thereafter, the decline was sharp and consistently downward,
falling under 50 percent in 1980. Consideringthe precipitous fall in industrial production
between 1980-1984, we estimate the time utilization rate at between 30 and 35 percent
by 1985, and probably closer to 30 percent. This easily puts it at the lowest level com-
pared to any other year since1950.
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Derivationof Capital Utilization Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5} (6) (7)
Price Exp. Exp. Total Exp. Index of Index of Index of
Index Fuels Elec. Fuel & El. Tot. Pwr Cap.Stk. Capital
El. Pwr. Mill. P Mill. P Mill. P Consptn. in Place Utilization
(1972= (1972 (1972 (1972 (1972= (1972= (1972=100)
Year 100) Prs.) Prs.) Prs.) 100) 100)
1956 49.3 65.5 17.1 82.6 16.1 16:3 98.7
1957 48.3 79.8 25.9 105.7 20.6 ] 8.4 111;9
1958 48.0 77.1 34.4 111.4 21.7 20.9 103.8
1959 46.9 88.4 44.4 132.7 25.9 23.2 111.6
1"960 47;0 92.8 49.6 142.4 27.8 26.7 104.1
1961 46.8 • • 166.3' 32.4 31.3 103.5
1962 46.6 118.9 7i.2 190.1 37.0 37.7 98.1
1963 46.4 .... 201.1 * 39.2 41.7 95.6
1964 46.1 •. 212:2* 41.4 46.7 88.7
1965 54.6 133.9 8_).2 223.0 43..5 52.3 83.2
1966 56.6 ..... 258.5* 50.3 59:9 83.9
1967 56.6 • • 293.9* 57.3 66.8 85.7
1968 56.0• 181.8 lJt'l.7 329.4 64.2 71.7 89.5
1969 56.1 215.7 156.4 372.1 72.5 79.6 91.1
1970 70.2 215.1 167.8 382.8 74.6 89.0 83.8
1971 81.0 281.4 206.7 468.0 91.2 94.1 96.9
1972 100.0 .... 513.1" 100.0 100.0 100.0
1973 104.8 • • . . 558.2* 108.7 107.3 101.3
1974 265.9 603.2* 117.6 114.7 102.5
1975 299.4 38:3.9 2_14.4 648.3 126.3 122.7 102.9
1976 327.6 .. 316:6 662.4 129.1 132.3 97.6
1977 336.2 • • 328.1 676.0 131.7 142.6 92.4
1978 342.5 .... 689.9* 134.5 154.3 87.2
1979 366.3 .. 704.7* 137.3 165.5 83.0
1980 549.4 205.0* 5i 2.6 717.6 139.9 180.1 77.7
t= ,,
.. Indicates data not available
• estimated
•Source: NCSO, Survey of Manufacturing Establishments, and
Appendices B. and D.
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APPENDIX D
ESTIMATES OF CAPITAL STOCK IN MANUFACTURING,
BY INpUSTRY AT REPLACEMENT COST,
1956-1980
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Appendix D
Estimates of Capital Stock in Manufacturing,
by Industry at Replacement Cost, 1956 - 1980
Some investigators have estimated capital stock by adjusting fixed assets shown
atdepreciatedvaluesinvariousissuesof the Survey of Manufactures.We haveeschewed
thisapproach mainly becausesince1970, ithas become standardpracticeforaccount-
ants to carryfixedassetsnot at origina[costsbut at valuesinflatedby a revaluation
conducted by a consultingengineerwhich reflectshissubjectivevaluationof the re-
placement cost of the assets.The revaluationisdone periodicallybut not necessarily
annually,so thatnot only the method of revaluationbut alsothe dateof revaluation
We have adopted the perpetualinventorymethod. To use thismethod, we first
must refinethe annual investmentexpendituredata.The Survey recordsthe additions
of fixed assetsby establishmentsannually- additionsin the form of both used and
new assets,includingthe valueof own account construction.However, one defectin
theSurvey'reportsisthatapparentlythe samplingframe omits investmentexpenditures
of new firms,and therebyunderestimatestotalinvestmentexpenditures.We therefore
were requiredto adjustfor thisundercoveragebecausefailureto do so would incor-
poratesuch errorsof understatementintoour estimatesofcapitalassetson a cumulative
basis.
The underreporting of new firms' investment expenditures can readily be seen by
comparing Census expenditure estimates with the Survey estimates of the year imme-
diately preceding the census. Over tinie, this traces out a "stepwise" pattern whereby
the Census estimate almost invariably exceeds the trend implicit in the Survey estimates
by a wide margin. The following diagram illustrates the pattern.
f
f
,,/
t_ Million A i i" £3
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trend of the Surveys is the B trend which is significantly below that implied
straight line drawn connectingthe two censusestimates.We derivedthe Survey
B, by fitting a least squarestrend to observedSurvey values.Then we com-
ration of this to the implicit trend line A obtained by connectingCensus
correctingthe intercensal(Survey) observationsby the ratio (A/B) for each
this way we obtained a set of correctedannualvaluesconsistentwith Census
benchmarks.The latter are then deflated by the use of an investmentprice deflator
annual investmentexpendituresin constant (1972) prices. The investment
is basedon data shown in Power (1979), updatedto 1980 and usingfixed
combining machinery and equipment (.75) and constructioncosts (.25).
resultinginvestmentprice index for inflating investmentexpendituresis shown
InvestmentGoodsPriceDeflator
(1972 = 1.00)
1946 3.451 1964 1.704
1947 3.448 1965 1,689
1948 3.448 1966 1;656
1949 3.451 1967 1.636
1950 3.178 1968 1.585
1951 2.598 1969 1.496
1952 2.476 1970 1.241
1953 2.680 1971 1.074
1954 2.828 1972 1.000
1955 2.843 1973 0.680
1956 2.897 1974 0.880
1957 2.757 1975 0.653
1958 2.578 1976 0.605
1959 2.377 1977 0.564
1960 21113 1978 0.520
1961 1.965 1.979 0.441
1962 1.845 1980 0.388
1963 1.716
grosscapital stock by summing over the depreciabtelife of assets.That is,
depreciablelife asour estimateof actual life. Hence,we have
n
.Kgt (I/P)t-.i
i=1
.1i8
where Kg isgrosscapital stock, (I/P) t I investmentin time periodt-I deflated by the
investmentgoods price index of the--s=_me•period, and real investment is cumulated
over the n years of asset life. We adopt the suddendeath assumptionwhereby assets
dropout of the capital stockafter n yearsof use.
We do not have to guessat n. The Census givesactual valuesof n usedin each
industry for 1975. We have used these and extrapolatedthem backwardsto 1956 and
forward to 1980 by utilizing dataon the compositionof fixed assets,asshownin various
issuesof the Census,and usingweightsimplicit in Bulletin F for different assetclasses.
Averageassetlife for fixed assetsof manufacturingindustriesis given in the following
table.
DepreciableLife of Assetsby Industry,1975
(iny_s)
All Manufacturing 14.28 TransportEquipment 20.01
Food 10.62 Glass 13.65
SugarMilling 15.66 FabricatedMetals 14.84
Beverages 20;20 RubberProducts 16:80
Tobacco 8.16 PetroleumRefining 15.15
Textiles 9.91 IndustrialChemicals 17.34
WearingApparel 17.17 Other Chemicals 12.72
Printing& Iron & Steel 12;00
Publishing 15.45 Non-Ferrous Metals 16.32
PaperProducts 20.60 Non-Metallic Mineral
Footwear(eX. Products 17.34
rubber) 15.83 Machinery (ex,
WoodProducts 10.60 electricity) 16.64
Furniture&
Fixtures 11.88 Electrical•Machinery 9.18
Leather Products •20;00
PlasticProducts 12.84
Since.we now have Kg, we can derive net fixed•capital stock for each industryby the
equation
nj "
4 ;
KJ nJ A jt t ..-
•nj is depreciablelife of assetsin the jth industry and A is derived usingthe
Censusreported valueof K._f., We then substitUteinto the aboveequationthe derived
valueof A, and obtain K_; t for eachyear for eachof our j industries.The result•is
capitalstocknet of depreci_ion expressedat replacementcostin 1972 prices.
119
Net capital stock at time t is Kd*] = K_tt + It/ where I is inventory held by
largefirms for any given year, deflated by an index which combines pricesof finished
goods for industry j an index Of the cost of factory labor and the generalprice index
of processedinputs. For purposesof productivity measurement,however, we consider
Kd and / asseparateand distinct typesof inputs.
Estimatesof fixed capital at replacementcostand inventory, by industry, are shown
in Annex D.
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APPENDIX E
ADJUSTMENT OF INTERMEDIATE INPUTS FOR CHANGES
IN EFFECTIVE PROTECTION RATES, BY MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY,
1956-1980
(Erlinda Medallaand Richard Hooley)
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Appendix E
Adjustment of Intermediate inputs for Changes
in Effective Protection Rates,by Manufacturing Industry,
1956 - 1980
(Erlinda Medalla and Richard Hooley)
The Census defines grossvalue added as grossproduction less the value of inter-
mediate inputs. How intermediate inputs are valued therefore has a critical impact on
measuresof inputs use as well as the magnitude of value added. In this _.tudy,we derived
estimatesof intermediate goods consumptionas P_-VA *t= M _whereP, VA, and M
denote gross production, grossvalue addedand intermediate-goods'consumed,respective-
ly, and the asterisksindicate deflated values.
We havedescribed in Appendix C the derivation of the producer price index used to
deflate manufacturing production in this study. Wecould proceed to deflate value added
also with this index. This would constitute the single-deflated procedure commonly uti-
lized to derive real value added both in this country and in most LDCs. However,where
tariffs on manufactured goodsare prevalent, single deflation of value added is likely to re-
sult in significant upward bias in the deflated value added series, and a corresponding
downward bias in the resulting intermediate goodsseries.
When tariffs are applied to manufactured goods, the resulting structure almost inevi-
tably manifests a "cascading" character. Effective protect onrates are highest on manu_
facturing production for final use and lowest on production destined for intermediate
consumption (Bautista, Power and Associates, 1979). The effective protection expe-
rienced by an industry consistsof an increasein the price of final production, which causes
the level of producers prices to rise at a rate •equalto the rate of increasein the nominal
tariff.* The price of the corresponding intermediate inputs often risesat a less_'rate, and
may even fall, becauseof a reduction of protection on imported inputs. The first element
should be caught by the producers price index - since the rise in the price of domestic
production due to the tariff change is implicit in quoted prices of shipmentsex factory.
The second element, however, is not measured by the final goods price index. If this ele-
ment is not dealt with explicitly, value added will generally be overstated and interme.
diate input consumptionunderstated.
To illustrate, suppose P/ is the tariff inclusive price at time t per unit of output
i • pti the tariff inclusive price at time t per unit of input i , aii the physical input-
output coefficients, T _ , the implicit tariff on output and T _the implicit tariff on
input i. Obviously, changes in Ts will affect the P's and thus VA, i,e., with every-
thing elseconstant, over time VAt would changeif the T's changc.
One adjustment we want to make is to eliminate the effects of changesin T's on
value-added.That is, we want
t Pit aij
VA+1 _ _ _,
I + Tt. 1+ T.tj I
*On the assumptionthat producersraisesellingpricesto thenewentry-levelpricesof com-
petingimports.
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where VA+I is valueaddedadjusted for difference in tariffs on output and input. Now,
EPR.t = pjt _ Z. Pit alj1 + 7
pjt / l + 7-./_ =pi t aij / i +
whereEPRj isthe effective protection rate Onthej th unit of output. Thus:
VAt
VA+I =
t • + EPRjt
•We also want VA in real terms, i.e., we want to deflate VA by the changein prices
other than that causedby tariff changes.To do this, we deflate VA alsoby producers
price index.
VA+1
VASt = t o
P" / PJ 1
This implies,however, that input pricesexclusiveof tariffs changeproportionate-
ly as the output exclusiveof tariff. •This is probably the most reasonableassumption
to make, especiallyfor caseswith high VA. Furthermore,with a numberof interme-
diate inputs involved•per output, input price changescould averageout to be approxi-
mately the sameasoutput price.
Hence,combiningboth adjustments,we have
VAt
VA_t =
p.t
; ( .1 . + EPRt )
P_.
However,aswe noted, pt pO , our price index,already includeschangesin tariffs.
Hence,to avoiddouble-count/ng,w/etake this.out in our final formula, which is:
VAt
VA *t =
t
P.
) ( .i + EPR t ),
pjO. 1 . + T.t!
*we estimatedtariff levels,for1956.fromdata in RobertBaldwin{1975)asw,ell asfrom in-
formationsuppliedby personnelof the Departmentof EconomicResearchat theCentral'Bank,
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It is virtually impossible to estimate EPR for each year from 1955.1980. What we
propose is to simply take three points in time where EPR has already been estimated or
can more easily be estimated. First, we choose 1955 as our base year when tariffs were
minimal and hence close to unity.* The work by Norma Tan on EPR provided us with
benchmark for 1974. Finally, a middle point chosen is 1969 where an I.O table with cor-
responding implicit tariffs by I-0 sector is available (implicit tariffs for 1969 from Norma
Tan). Using these three points, we interpolated the remaining years.
In our calculation of the EPR index, we encountered the problem of averaging with-
in groups of commodities and for all manufacturing, specifically what weights to use.
Previous studies, such as Tan's, used free trade value-added per unit of output. However,
we found that a few sectors such asrice, corn, etc. would dominate because of their rela-
tively very high value added per unit and very low value added of others. So we revised
the weights to be the total free trade value-added by the sector. This is done by multiply-
ing the free trade value-added rates by the value of output (in border prices, i.e., deflated
by 1 + T).
The following table contains our estimates of value-added adjustment by the indus-
try.
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